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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 4.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Honorable Andrew Stone found Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and
Attorney Richard M. LaJeunesse’s objectively reasonable positions, taken in good faith,
were either legally permissible or at least did not violate express statute or policy and did
not amount to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Addendum, Ex. 1,
Concl.Law,1 ¶ 31, R. 1044. Relying in part on In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 868-9, 878
(Utah 1996), the court rejected OPC’s analysis that LaJeunesse’s authorization and return
of medical reports to medical panels without notice to parties caused delay and increased
costs, because R. Prof. Conduct Rule 8.4(d) (Rule 8.4(d))2 must require some daylight
between reasonable interpretations of the law and ethical violations. Concl.Law, ¶¶ 2330, R. 1041-4.
In light of these findings, the issue is whether OPC carried its burden to prove

1

Concl.Law refers to the court’s conclusions of law. Findings refers to the court’s
Findings of Fact.
2

The rule states: Rule 8.4. Misconduct. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Addendum
Ex. 2.
2

these findings clearly erroneous, or show that the court’s legal analysis was incorrect.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court “presume[s] the district court’s findings of fact to be correct ‘unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in error,’ [giving] less deference to the findings
than it otherwise would, . . . ‘reserv[ing] the right to draw inferences from basic facts
which may differ from the inferences drawn’ by the district court[,]” Office of
Professional Conduct v. Barrett, 2017 UT 10, ¶ 11 (citations omitted); or unsupported.
Utah State Bar v. Jardine, 2012 UT 67, ¶ 26, 289 P.3d 516, 521-2. Findings of fact must
be proved clearly erroneous through compliance with marshaling. In re Pendleton, 2000
UT 77, ¶¶ 20, 58, 11 P.3d 284, 287, 299.
The Utah Supreme Court ultimately determines discipline. Barrett, ¶ 11, U TAH
C ONST. art. VIII, § 4.
Statutory interpretation (question of general law) is reviewed for correctness.
Johnston v. Labor Comm’n, 2013 UT App 179, ¶ 13, 307 P.3d 615, 620 (citations
omitted).
OPC has the burden of proof. R. Prof. Conduct Rule 14-517.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, section 4
3

Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4(d)
Rules Professional Conduct Rule 14-517.
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601(2) (LexisNexis 2011)3
Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-104 (LexisNexis 2011)
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-802 (2012)
Admin. Code R. 602-2-2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an attorney discipline case, alleging conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d).
B.

Course of Proceedings

The district court presided over a trial.
C.

Disposition in the Court below

The district court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Third District Court Judge Andrew Stone (hereinafter “the court”) presided over a

3

Section 34A-2-601 was amended in 2013. See 2013 Utah Laws Ch. 428. The
amendments are not material to this appeal, therefore Mr. LaJeunesse cites to the last
published version of the code throughout this brief. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601
(LexisNexis 2011), Addendum Ex. 3 (Resp. Ex. 1).
4

five day trial, issuing detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March
16, 2016, indicating the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
Addendum Ex. 1.
2.

The ALJs of the Adjudication Division (Division) of the Utah Labor Commission
(Commission) adjudicate inter alia, disputes between occupationally injured
employees and their employers and/or their insurance carriers for workers
compensation benefits. Utah Code §34A-2-801 (2012), Findings, ¶ 5, R. 1027.

3.

Two of these ALJs were attorneys Richard LaJeunesse (LaJeunesse) and Debbie
Hann (Hann).

4.

LaJeunesse, an attorney since 1987, licensed in Utah since 1996, began his Utah
career as a hearing officer at the Labor Commission in 1995, Findings, ¶ 3, R.
1026, and became an ALJ within the Division in 2000. Except for the instant
matter, he has never been disciplined by an employer or faced a bar complaint. He
received three Governor’s Awards for excellence related to his employment at the
Commission, and an individual award from Governor Huntsman for integrity.
LaJeunesse, R. 595-601, 1174-5, 1507.

5.

Hann and LaJeunesse had the highest rates of all the Commission ALJs of being
upheld on appeal at both the Commission and the Utah Court of Appeals.
LaJeunesse, R. 1249-50, see also Hayashi, R. 1813. According to Dawn Atkin, an

5

attorney who has practiced exclusively in the field of workers compensation,
representing injured workers for twenty-three years, LaJeunesse’s opinions were
“always very well written [and] timely . . . so important to injured workers. . . . [He
brought back to the Commission] the full decision with a good outline of facts, a
good outline of conclusions of law and order. . . .” Atkin, R. 2060, 2063-4.
6.

Hann was very good at writing orders, her decisions stood on appeal, and she was
the fastest judge at the Commission. Atkin, R. 2064.

7.

LaJeunesse and Hann were two of the very best judges at the Commission
according to Ford Scalley, who has practiced before the Commission since 1971,
doing mostly defense work. Scalley, R. 2104.

8.

LaJeunesse was presiding judge and Director of the Division from 2001 until
2012, during which time he supervised other ALJs, including Hann. LaJeunesse,
R. 1175, Findings, ¶ 3, R. 1026-7. All of LaJeunesse’s actions were taken as part
of his duties as an ALJ and Director of the Adjudication Division. Findings, ¶ 30,
R. 1030, LaJeunesse R. 1274.

9.

Commission ALJs are expected to take an active role in obtaining all facts
necessary to get to the truth of the case. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-802, LaJeunesse,
R. 1502-3, Commission ALJ Holley, R. 2162, Sutton v. Barker, 2010 UT Wrk.
Comp. Lexis 105 (ALJ directed to “take affirmative steps, including issuance of

6

subpoenas” to obtain critical testimony) at Resp. Ex. 13, Bates 33. Contrast OPC’s
characterization that Hann rejected reports “not to her liking. . . .” OPC.Brief 4 ,
Fact ¶ 9.
10.

Commission ALJs are expected to be experts in the field. Price River Coal Co. v.
Indus. Comm’n of Utah, 731 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 1986) (determination of
benefits relies “heavily upon the Commission’s expertise. . . .”).

11.

Workers compensation cases place merits over procedure or evidentiary
technicalities when possible. Kallas v. U.S. Steel, 2006 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 78
at Resp. Ex. 6, Bates 13-4, citing 34A-2-802(1). Commissioner Hayashi (Hayashi)
did not know ALJs’ duties included investigation, ALJs were to adjudicate cases in
the best way to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties, or that Commission’s
statutes allow simplified methods for proof. Hayashi, R. 1879-80.

12.

From approximately 2001 forward, LaJeunesse and Hann revised administrative
code rules for the Division in addition to carrying full case loads, drafting forms
for use by applicants, and writing the Division’s first policies. LaJeunesse wrote
from scratch administrative code provisions, while overseeing the Division
(including workers’ compensation cases, employment discrimination appeals,
OSHA penalty cases, Division of Industrial Accidents penalty cases, and hearings

4

For purposes of clarity, OPC’s Appellant’s Brief is referenced as OPC.Brief, and
WCF’s Amicus Curiae Brief is referenced as WCF.Brief. Roman numerals reference the
Point number.
7

for the Departments of Corrections and Agriculture). LaJeunesse relied on Hann’s
extensive prior administrative law experience as presiding law judge in the
Department of Human Services and her knowledge of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act. LaJeunesse, R. 1200, 1503-5. Before there were policies,
LaJeunesse worked from flow charts, administrative code, and statutes.
LaJeunesse, R. 1176, 1183. Hayashi testified Division directors could state what a
policy is, and it did not have to be in writing, R. 1886.
13.

As Director of Adjudication, LaJeunesse required ALJs to resolve conflicts of fact
per Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. Comm’n of
Utah, 839 P. 2d 841, 847 n.7 (Utah App. 1992) (role of ALJ and Commission to
make findings of fact is nondelegable duty), Price River Coal, 731 P.2d at 1083-4.
Such interim findings, used by the medical panels, are not described in the statute.
LaJeunesse, R. 2150-2.

14.

In cases involving conflicting medical opinions generally between the treating
physician (renders an opinion as to the origin and compensability of the claimed
injury) and the employer or insurer’s physician (retained to perform an
independent medical examination), Findings, ¶¶ 7-8, R. 1027, the ALJ may
appoint a medical panel to advise and assist the ALJ regarding the contested
medical aspects of the case. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601(1), Utah Admin. Code
R. 602-2-2, Findings, ¶ 6, R. 1027.
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15.

Medical panels are physicians compensated by the Commission, and adjunct to the
ALJs. Findings, ¶¶ 10, 16, R. 1028-9, LaJeunesse, R. 1175-6, 1184, Hayashi, R.
1781-2, 1841 (“they are adjunct to the ALJs”), Doherski v. Big Horn Trucking and
Workers Compensation Fund, Commission Order, Case No. 07-0734 (medical
panel adjunct to impartial fact-finding responsibilities of ALJ and Commission) at
Resp. Ex. 18, Bates 49, Owens v. Beckstrom Body Shop, Commission Order Case
No. 02-0214 (panel is impartial adjunct) at Resp. Ex. 5, Bates 11.

16.

“The function of the medical panel is to give the Commission ‘the benefit of its
diagnosis . . . within . . . its expertise.’ IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830
(Utah 1978).” Intermountain Health Care, 839 P.2d at 845 (“role . . . is only ‘to
assist the [ALJ] in deciding whether medical cause has been proven[,]’” citing
Price River Coal, 731 P.2d at 1084 (footnotes omitted). Contrast OPC.Brief, Fact
6, blurring the impartial role of the panel with “independence,” and WCF.Brief,
II(A) at 16, with citations to WCF attorneys Lloyd and Scheffler mistakenly
claiming panels are “independent.” The word independence does not appear in
§34A-2-601. See Court’s comment, R. 2026.

17.

Some practitioners correctly understood the role of the medical panels (Atkin:
“they are just like a judge,” “they are the judges’ doctors”, R. 2071, Scalley: they
are “basically arms to help the [ALJ] in deciding a case where there is conflicting
medical evidence.”), R. 2102.
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18.

Complaints about medical panel reports had been ongoing since before
LaJeunesse’s time at the Commission. Findings, ¶ 18, R. 1029, LaJeunesse, R.
1192.

19.

LaJeunesse, as Director of Adjudication, was responsible to recruit, train, and
retain medical panels. Findings, ¶ 17, R. 1029, LaJeunesse, R. 1435. All medical
panel training was in-house. Id. Training sessions were held at least once a year.
Findings, ¶ 20, R. 1029, Resp. Ex. 22 (LaJeunesse’s Training Agendas 20082012). LaJeunesse wrote the Medical Panel Process Summary (Process
Summary), R. 1272, 1435, used to train the panels. Resp. Ex. 8. LaJeunesse also
met with attorneys quarterly to learn their concerns, tried to address physicians’
concerns when they raised questions on their cases, and conducted one-on-one
training of new panel chairs, R. 1190, 1275, 1435, 1528, 1540. See Findings, ¶¶
20-21, R. 1029. No statute guided the orientation and training process.
LaJeunesse, R. 1190, 1202, 1435. Hayashi was unaware of the training process,
and was a “hands off” administrator. R. 1844-5, 1887.

20.

The Process Summary directed the panel chair to contact the judge concerning
“any questions about the Medical Panel Referral[,]” and to “return[] [the report] to
the referring judge. . . .” Resp. Ex. 8.

21.

ALJs’ interim findings resolved factual disputes (e.g., the weight of a box being
lifted, or mechanism of injury), which were binding on the panel; leaving the panel
10

to resolve only outstanding medical issues. Findings, ¶ 11, R. 1028, LaJeunesse,
R. 1255, 1260-1.
22.

Parties had been on notice since at least 2000, via the ALJs’ template letters sent to
medical panels with interim findings of fact, Resp. Ex. 2, that panel members were
free to “contact the judge concerning any questions about the Medical Panel
Referral.” See Findings, ¶ 21, R. 1029, Resp. Ex. 8, 15, Hayashi, R. 1857,
LaJeunesse, R. 1253-4. Nobody had ever objected to the ex parte
communications. LaJeunesse, R. 1254, 1427. Ex parte communications continued
to at least the time of trial. Atkin, R. 2065-6, Scalley, R. 2110, Thomas, R. 2128.

23.

In late 2011 and early 2012, complaints about the quality of medical panel reports
heated to the point of “boiling over.” See Findings, ¶ 22, R. 1030, LaJeunesse, R.
1209-10, 1212, Lloyd, R. 1321-3, Hayashi, R. 1859, 1978, Resp. Ex. 23.

24.

Workers Compensation Fund (WCF)’s own physician, Dr. Stewart, worked
directly with the Commission and drove many of the complaints. Stewart had
particular concerns over Dr. Hurwitz’s reports. Hurwitz, a pain specialist,
appointed to address pain issues, had found causation (against WCF) in five
permanent total disability cases, costing WCF a lot of money. LaJeunesse, R.
1208, 1210, 1446-7, Scheffler, R. 1594, Lloyd, R. 1321-2, 1324.

25.

WCF complained panels lacked experience, chased obscure and highly unlikely
diagnoses, recommended tests or procedures that lacked validity, and were too
11

involved in pain issues. Lloyd, R. 1322-3, Resp. Ex. 23, Bates 65.
26.

In February 2012, the Commission’s Director of Industrial Accidents noted WCF’s
attorney Lloyd’s conversation about “encouraging solutions on behalf of the
[WCF].” Resp. Ex. 29.

27.

In late 2011 and early 2012, two new medical panel chairs, Dr. Thomas and Dr.
Rosen, generated reports that received a lot of objections. Holley, R. 2157. Dr.
Holmes also needed training, LaJeunesse, R. 1226-7.

28.

On January 10, 2012, Holley queried, “[d]o we need to start returning . . . reports
to the med panel doctors if they don’t satisfy the standard outlined in that recent
Court of Appeals case. . . ?” R. 2156-9, Resp. Ex. 23. On January 17, 2012,
Commission ALJ Lima wrote “[j]udges and [medical panel] chairs may wish to
invite more communication about the case. . . .” Resp. Ex. 60, LaJeunesse, R.
1450.

29.

In early January 2012, the Commission discussed increasing supervisory oversight
of the reports, including returning the reports for failure to meet legal standards.
Resp. Ex. 23, Bates 65-6, LaJeunesse, R. 1542.

30.

If a panel report did not adequately support its decision, the case was remanded
and assigned to a new medical panel to better flesh out issues. Holley, R. 2159-60.

31.

Such remands cause delay and harm to all parties, and even non-parties. Holley,
R. 2159-60.
12

32.

There were no explicit or implicit guidelines on how the ALJs should train the
medical panels, nor were there any policies on the issue. Hayashi, R. 1825, 1838.

33.

LaJeunesse had complete discretion on how to train the panels. Hayashi, R. 1838.

34.

Complaints about the panels included their failure to understand legal definitions
applicable to injured workers. See Findings, ¶ 19, R. 1029, Resp. Ex. 24,
LaJeunesse, R. 1443-5. For example, aggravation or exacerbation of a preexisting
medical problem could be compensable. LaJeunesse, R. 1444-5, Price River Coal,
731 P.2d at 1081 (discussing the definitive case of Allen v. Indus. Comm’n, 729
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) standard of focusing on questions of legal and medical
causation).

35.

Medical stability is legally defined (healing has ended, condition will not
improve), so ALJs needed to make sure panels used correct terms. See Findings, ¶
19, R. 1029, LaJeunesse, R. 1440, Booms v. Rapp, 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah
1986) at Resp. Ex. 29, Bates 62.

36.

Because the legal concept of medical causation has been developed through a long
line of case law, that legal definition may have no distinct meaning to the doctor.
If the report does not describe whether the accident contributed to the current
problem, even if it did not cause it; or answer the question of whether the accident
caused the need for surgery, the report is legally flawed. Atkin, R. 2067-8.

37.

Doctors were uncomfortable using definitive answers such as “yes” or “no”
13

required in order for the report to align with case law. See Findings, ¶ 19, R. 1029.
Even use of the word “likely” (rather than a definitive statement) had caused an
appeal. Hayashi, R. 1936, LaJeunesse, R. 1437, 1474.
38.

The statute states:
(b) A medical panel . . . shall make:
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed
by the Division of Adjudication; and
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require.

Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601(2)(b). Findings, ¶ 13, R. 1028. OPC does not cite to
section (2)(b) in its brief.
39.

The statute further states:
An administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a report

submitted to the administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by mail to:
(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer;
(C) the employer’s insurance carrier; and
(D) an attorney employed by [the above].

Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601(2)(d). Findings, ¶ 14, R. 1028.
40.

Neither “in a form prescribed” nor “promptly” are statutorily defined.

41.

LaJeunesse and Hann were at all times charged with interpreting §34A-2-601.
14

Hayashi, R. 1840.
42.

Under §34A-2-601(2)(b), the report is written to the administrative law judge.

43.

In January 2012, LaJeunesse and Hann discussed whether the statute permitted the
ALJ to reject a report and request changes to its form to comply with legal
requirements applicable to the reports. Findings, ¶ 23, R. 1030. LaJeunesse read
§34A-2-601(2)(b) to allow use of adjudicatory discretion to request additional
findings, and make sure the report was in proper legal form before sending it to the
parties; or to train the panel. Findings, ¶ 24, R. 1030, LaJeunesse, R. 1178, 1188,
1420. The court found LaJeunesse, R. 1189, 1219, had a good faith belief that his
statutory interpretation permitted the return of a signed report to a medical panel
for technical revision was correct. Findings, ¶ 25, R. 1030.

44.

LaJeunesse’s purpose in permitting return of reports was to correct errors of law or
phrasing in the reports (“put it into proper form”, R. 1424) and to train the
physicians who had prepared them, with no purpose to substantively change the
medical opinion or the underlying result in any of the cases; Findings, ¶ 26, R.
1030, to address complaints about report quality while avoiding costly and harmful
appeals. The new approach was to address persistent issues. LaJeunesse, R. 1424,
1535-7, 1554, 1560.

45.

LaJeunesse, R. 1518, 1566-7, and Hann reasoned that seeking clarifications under
(2)(b) before distributing the reports under (2)(d) followed legitimate constructs of
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statutory interpretation under Esquivel v. Labor Comm’n of Utah, 2000 UT 66, ¶
24, 7 P.3d 777, 782.
46.

The statute does not require notice to the parties if the ALJ seeks additional
findings. Hayashi, R. 1811, 1822-3, §34A-2-601(2).

47.

No appellate court has ruled on ALJs LaJeunesse’s and Hann’s interpretation.
Hayashi, R. 1823.

48.

Prior practice of distributing flawed reports was ineffective in resolving obvious
legal issues, resulting in rounds of objections and harmful delays. Past methods of
training had not calmed the “furor” over flawed reports. LaJeunesse, R. 1206,
1551-2.

49.

Between January of 2012 and June 6, 2012, Judge Hann, in five separate workers’
compensation cases, requested written clarifications to the medical panel reports
under §34A-2-601(2)(b)(i), (ii) without notice to the parties. Hann determined the
medical opinions would not change before seeking the clarifications. LaJeunesse,
R. 1473-4. In two of the cases, the doctors had already asked LaJeunesse to
review draft reports prior to submission, but he did not have time to do so.
LaJeunesse, R. 1207-8, Resp. Ex. 31.

50.

No testimony was offered by any witness suggesting that the changes in these three
cases known to LaJeunesse did not address legitimate concerns over the legal form
of the reports. No testimony was offered that any of the medical opinions in the
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reports were substantively altered as a result of the contact from Hann or
LaJeunesse. Findings, ¶¶ 34-7, R. 1032. OPC conceded the point, indicating it
was not relevant for purposes of violation of Rule. 8.4(d). R. 2181-2, Resp. Ex. 75
(Hennebold’s letter describing four of the five cases: Case A, “the medical panels
stated the same ultimate opinion to the two questions. . .”, Case B, “[t]he panel’s
ultimate conclusions and recommendations did not change from the first version to
the second version”, Case C, “the revised . . . report used more temperate
language, approved more sessions with a physical therapist and recognized the
propriety of using over the counter medications,” Case D, “the panel’s ultimate
conclusion remained the same in both the original and the revised reports.”), see
also Hayashi, R. 1980-1. The Governor’s Audit (Audit) found the “Medical Panel
chairs do not believe changes impacted outcomes.” Pet. Ex. 104 at 10 (P 0246),
WCF.Brief at 10 listing Audit details. Acosta testified, R. 2047, the changes in
Boyt “had no substantial effect” and were just language choice changes. WCF
erroneously asserts changes were “by definition, substantive.” WCF.Brief., III(B)
at 24-5.
51.

LaJeunesse was personally involved in one of the five cases, involving Dr.
Holmes’ report in Swenson v. Modern Display. LaJeunesse discussed with
Holmes that the final report would clarify that Holmes had not relied solely on
treatment guidelines (which Holmes favored), thereby back-dooring non-binding
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protocols in violation of administrative rules process, but rather, had reached his
own independent conclusion. LaJeunesse confirmed the clarification would not
change Dr. Holmes’s ultimate medical opinion prior to requesting the clarification.
Holmes agreed to change the report, offering to bring in an amended report
personally. Findings, ¶ 31, R. 1031, LaJeunesse, R. 1224-7, 1515, 1554, 1560-61,
Resp. Ex. 50.
52.

The original and revised report in the Boyt case, which LaJeunesse knew about,
along with the doctor’s explanations for the clarifications, were provided to the
parties. LaJeunesse, R. 1470, Acosta, R. 2045. Dr. Rosen, the physician in the
Boyt case, at Hann’s request, clarified the probability on causation to a definitive
“no” answer where the probability was less than 2%. The change did not alter Dr.
Rosen’s opinion to original answers to questions posed. Findings, ¶ 35-6, R.
1031-2, Resp. Ex. 40, Bates 96, Rosen, R. 2041-2. This issue had previously
caused appeal. LaJeunesse R. 1551-2.

53.

Judge Hann sent back the Duheric case, the third case known to LaJeunesse, for
the medical panel to clarify that it relied upon her interim findings of fact rather
than the worker’s varied stories, as required (supra, Facts, ¶ 13, p. 8). WCF
appealed the same issue in Right Way Trucking, LLC. v. Labor Comm’n, 2015 UT
App 2010 ¶ ¶ 7, 9, 357 P.3d 1024, 1026-7 at Resp. Ex. 40, Miller R. 1693-4,
LaJeunesse R. 1551-2. The original, revised (Dr. Rosen deleted discussion of
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alternative versions of the fall at issue) and letter of explanation on Duheric were
provided to the parties. LaJeunesse, R. 1470, Findings, ¶ 36, R. 1031-2. Dr.
Rosen testified he made no changes to the ultimate medical conclusions, R. 2041.
Even though Hann was no longer on the case, the successive ALJ did not appoint
another panel. Petersen, R. 1746-7.
54.

Prior practice of distributing flawed reports did not morph into policy, nor could it
supercede the statute. Johnston, 2013 UT App 179, ¶ 22 (court was not persuaded
that “Board’s supposed preference [for multi-member panels under §34A-2-601]
has somehow morphed into a binding practice that supercedes the statute[]”),
LaJeunesse, R.1423-4.

55.

LaJeunesse, R. 1178, 1189, 1200, and Hann knew of no policy preventing
requesting clarifications to the panel reports either as a device to train the medical
panels or to avoid appeals over known legal issues; and the court found no written
policy expressly forbade return of the panel report to the panel. Findings, ¶ 56, R.
1034, Hayashi, R. 1855. Hann and LaJeunesse in 2009 had written the existing
policy, which was stored on LaJeunesse’s computer and in the Commission’s
internal intranet system, accessible only to employees. Findings, ¶ 57, R. 1034,
LaJeunesse, R. 1183, 1480, 1517-9.

56.

On June 5, 2012, Dori Petersen, workers’ compensation defense counsel at
Blackburn & Stoll, called the Commission on one of her cases. The clerk

19

informed her that the case had been returned to panel status after Hann received a
report from Dr. Rosen, but rejected it, “to have something corrected before it was
sent out to the parties.” Findings, ¶ 38, R. 1032, LaJeunesse, R. 1216. The clerk
explained the doctor was new and needed instruction. The Commission
incorrectly informed Petersen she would not get the original report because it had
been shredded. Petersen subsequently received both the original and clarified
reports. Petersen, R. 1716-7, 1719, 1722, Resp. Ex. 37, Bates 88, Findings, ¶ 40,
R. 1032.
57.

Petersen wrote in an email copied to WCF, “[i]f it were anybody but Judge Hann, I
probably wouldn’t think much about this, but it’s Judge Hann,” further describing
the medical panel as a wild card. Findings, ¶¶ 38-9, R. 1032. “She was a difficult
judge, and I always had to prepare my cases very well[]”, R. 1717. Petersen “felt
like Judge Hann was more applicant oriented” and speculated the return of the
report to the panel was because the doctors’ opinions favorable to defense were
“ruffling . . . feathers [at the Commission].” R. 1718, Resp. Ex. 37, Bates 88.

58.

Hayashi requested the Audit, and ordered an investigation, releasing her Report on
July 10, 2012. The Commission concluded, and the court found, there was “no
basis to believe” that Hann and LaJeunesse attempted to “influence the panels’
opinions or change the substance of their reports.” “Instead,” the Commission
concluded, they “were motivated by a desire to have the medical panels clarify
20

their conclusions.” Findings, ¶¶ 29, 44, R. 1030, 1033, LaJeunesse, R. 1460,
Resp. Ex. 36, 56, Pet. Ex. 104 at P 0244, Resp. Ex. 57, Bates 158, Transcript
Hayashi (“We don’t believe there is any basis that the ALJs engaged in any type of
questionable communications with the medical panels in an effort to influence the
panels’ opinions or change the substance of their reports. Instead, it appears the
ALJs were motivated by a desire to have the medical panels clarify their
conclusions. . . .”).
59.

LaJeunesse and Hann had no desire to change medical opinions, intending only to
“address[] the criticisms and the concerns” being raised by the parties, making sure
panels had the “proper legal framework for what they were doing,” were “relying
on the interim orders, . . . [and] using a correct legal framework for . . . making
their decisions and not confusing medical opinions with legal opinions.”
LaJeunesse, R. 1189.

60.

Commissioner Hayashi accepted “that [Hann’s] intent was to ensure that the
medical panel reports were ‘finalized’ . . . in proper form under Section
601(2)(b)”. Hayashi, R. 1880, Resp. Ex. 59, Bates 190.

61.

Dr. Thomas, one of the panelists in a case at issue, testified that neither Judge
Hann nor Judge LaJeunesse ever attempted to influence any medical decision he
was making, nor could they have. Thomas, R. 2116-7, 2125.

62.

The medical panel report is not admitted into evidence until three things occur,
21

even though only two are expressed in §34A-2-601. Johnston, ¶¶ 26-30, 307 P.3d
at 623-4. Under -601(2)(d)(iii), the report is considered admitted if no written
objection is filed. Concl.Law, ¶ 6, R. 1036.
63.

The Commission has a lot of pro se litigants, requiring the judge to take an active
role. LaJeunesse, R. 1502-3.

64.

Hearings, though rare, may be held to resolve objections. Johnston, ¶¶ 26-30,
Miller, R. 1694.

65.

A report may be admitted if there are “no readily apparent deficiencies” over
objection and without a hearing. Johnston, ¶ 30, LaJeunesse, R. 1568-9.

66.

The ALJ may exclude the report if there are “readily apparent deficiencies” or if
“substantial” conflicting evidence supports a contrary finding. Findings, ¶ 12, R.
1028, Johnston, ¶ 30, §34A-2-601(2)(e)(ii), -601(2)(g)(ii), LaJeunesse, R. 1492,
Sutton v. Barker.

67.

Two of the medical panel physicians appreciated the input regarding clarifications.
“[T]hey had been asking for it for awhile.” LaJeunesse, R. 1541.

68.

After the events in question, the Commission instructed the ALJs they could no
longer interpret the statute as they had. LaJeunesse, R. 1481.

69.

No other ALJ under Commissioner Hayashi had been disciplined for interpreting
the law. Hayashi, R. 1882.

70.

Appellate courts have disagreed with the Commissioner’s interpretations of the
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law. Hayashi, R. 1882.
71.

Hayashi testified that the problem was the failure to inform the parties of the
decision to return the report or notify parties of the nature of the changes
requested. Findings, ¶ 49, R. 1033, Hayashi, R. 1810. OPC argued at trial that
interpretation of §34A-2-601 was not an issue, but the issue was the lack of
transparency. Townsend, R. 2170, 2177. Contrast OPC.Brief, II, asserting the
court erred in finding LaJeunesse’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable.

72.

The first policy on transparency was not enacted until October 2012, months after
the events in question. Hayashi, R. 1926-7, 1972-3, LaJeunesse, R. 1249, Resp.
Ex. 36, 49.

73.

The Audit revealed five cases total were sent back to the panels without notice to
the parties, Findings, ¶¶ 44-6, R. 1033, three of which had already been reported to
the Commission by Hann and LaJeunesse prior to them being locked out.
LaJeunesse, R. 1238, 1484-5. In four cases, original reports were recovered, and
in all three cases known to LaJeunesse. Findings, ¶¶ 44-46, R. 1033, Resp. Ex. 75.
At trial LaJeunesse learned that the interim acting director of adjudication
retrieved the original report and provided both reports to the parties on the fifth
case. Hayashi, R. 1806-8. The Audit revealed, and the court found, that no judges
other than Hann and LaJeunesse engaged in these acts. Findings, ¶ 55, R. 1034.
Parties in all cases still had the opportunity to object. LaJeunesse, R. 1219, 1239-
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40, 1478.
74.

LaJeunesse agreed to retrieve the original reports, but he was placed on
administrative leave, placed under a gag order and forbidden to have contact with
anyone involved after he had retrieved just two of the original reports.
LaJeunesse, R. 1234, 1236, Hayashi R. 1805-6, Resp. Ex. 43.

75.

To obtain the original drafts, LaJeunesse contacted medical panel doctors and
asked for copies of the first report. Though Hann had shredded two of the initial
reports, Findings, ¶ 31, R. 1030, LaJeunesse retrieved those same two reports from
the panel. LaJeunesse, R. 1186, 1238. LaJeunesse was initially unaware Hann or
her staff had shredded the first reports, Findings, ¶ 32, R. 1031, but was not
concerned about the acts because they were draft reports and the information
contained therein is highly confidential. Findings, ¶ 58, R. 1034, LaJeunesse, R.
1214, 1531, 1568, Resp Ex. 79, Bates 286-7, Hayashi R. 1868. OPC erroneously
states Hann shredded four of the five reports. OPC.Brief at 14.

76.

LaJeunesse was unaware (and the court found, Findings, ¶ 59, R. 1035) of Hann
requesting status changes in the SPUD (“system perpetually under development”)
data base system, but testified if Hann asked anyone to delete anything, “she did a
miserable job” because the information was there, in the public record. The SPUD
system accurately reflected that the report was returned. LaJeunesse, R. 1216,
1220, 1532, 1534.
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77.

In Swenson v. Modern Display, the parties received both the unclarified and
clarified reports, along with Dr. Holmes’ explanations of why he made the
changes. The new ALJ informed the parties the report had been sent back to the
panel to address a “procedural issue”. Miller, R. 1668, 1688, Lloyd, R. 1305,
1373-4. Holmes appreciated the ALJs’ guidance. Lloyd, R. 1374. Both the losing
party and Miller (WCF) requested the original report be “eliminated from the
record”, (and asked for a new panel and a different judge) prior to Miller
complaining to the Utah State Bar that “evidence had been destroyed.” Resp. Ex.
60, Miller, R. 1660-1.

78.

The SPUD case tracking system (public information) accurately reflected the
return of the case to “panel report pending” status when the flawed reports were
returned. Hayashi, R. 1862-3, LaJeunesse, R. 1216, 1533-4. No clerk was asked
to delete reference to the report being returned, because the system accurately
reflected the case report had been returned. LaJeunesse, R. 1534. The SPUD
system had limitations for case tracking, and if SPUD reflected the report as
“received” when it had in fact been returned to panel status, the time limit for the
judge to issue an order would have been erroneously triggered. LaJeunesse, R.
1532-3. Contrast OPC’s mistaken claim that LaJeunesse “assist[ed] and advis[ed]
Hann” in “(3) instructing staff . . . to delete references. . . .”, OPC.Brief, Fact 8.

79.

OPC conceded at trial, and the court found, there was no evidence LaJeunesse
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knew any reports were shredded, Findings, ¶ 58, R. 1034, 2028-9, 2039-40. Nor
was there any evidence LaJeunesse knew the SPUD database was changed until
after the fact. R. 2031, 2037. The court dismissed allegations of shredding
documents or approving data base alterations for lack of evidence. R. 2040.
Contrast OPC’s unsupported claim on appeal that LaJeunesse “assist[ed] and
advis[ed] Hann” “when she engaged in conduct” including “(2) shredding original
. . . reports. . . .” OPC.Brief, Fact 8.
80.

No testimony was introduced that any party appealed, despite all of them having
notice and opportunity, and none of the three cases LaJeunesse knew about was
appealed. Findings, ¶ 50, R. 1033, Hayashi, R. 1807, Cf., LaJeunesse, R. 1485.
No testimony was introduced that any party lost faith in the administration of
justice as a result of these actions. WCF speculated, without informing its client,
that this was the case. Findings, ¶ 50, R. 1035, Lloyd, R. 1365-6, Acosta, R. 20478, Miller, R. 1700-1 (the issue was the lack of transparency). The events drew
unfavorable media attention. Findings, ¶ 61, R. 1035, LaJeunesse, R. 1235.

81.

The acts of the Commissioner caused harmful delays. Attorney Burke, plaintiffs’
counsel who has practiced before the Commission since 1996, had a case
previously scheduled for a hearing before Hann that was delayed due to a recusal
filed by Blackburn & Stoll (Petersen, R. 1735) of which Burke had no notice.
Delay hurts his clients. Burke, R. 2055-7.
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82.

Had the Commission backed the ALJs’ interpretation rather than panicking, the
process would have been streamlined rather than delayed, as ultimately happened.
La Jeunesse, R. 1553.

83.

On June 5, Hennebold met with LaJeunesse and directed LaJeunesse to copy the
parties on any rejections or instructions to medical panel reports. Hennebold
believed while “Hann’s actions may have been entirely appropriate, the lack of
transparency is inappropriate.” Findings, ¶ 41, R. 1032, Resp. Ex. 39. June 8,
2012, after the events in question, Hayashi directed LaJeunesse to write a policy
requiring distribution of even flawed medical panel reports. Findings, ¶¶ 42-3, R.
1032, Hayashi, R. 1887-8, LaJeunesse, R. 1471, Resp. Ex. 42.

84.

LaJeunesse amended the policy in response to the events at issue, to send out even
flawed reports, to “increase transparency.” Findings, ¶ 57, R. 1034, LaJeunesse,
R. 1179, 1460, 1480, 1519, Resp. Ex. 52, Bates 124 (includes new language). The
old policy was not admitted into evidence. Findings, ¶ 56, R. 1034, court
comment, R. 1173.

85.

Hayashi placed LaJeunesse on administrative leave on June 13, 2012, terminated
him from his position as Director of Adjudication and ALJ on July 10, 2012 for his
failure to insist on an open and transparent process, Findings, ¶¶ 47-8, R. 1033,
then rehired him with the title of hearing officer but with the duties of ALJ, at a
lower wage. LaJeunesse, R. 1241-2, 1249-51, 1576.
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86.

WCF attorney Lloyd filed bar complaints against Hann and LaJeunesse on August
14, 2012, supported by WCF attorney Mr. Miller’s Affidavits. Pet. Ex. 117.5
Neither Lloyd nor Miller gave any consideration to subsection (2)(b) of 34A-2601. Lloyd, R. 1303, 1311, Miller, R. 1660, 1671. Petersen, defense counsel in
the Duheric case, likewise failed to distinguish subsections (2)(b) and (2)(d) of the
statute. Petersen, R. 1755.

87.

Miller did not know ALJs provided training to the medical panels. Miller, R.
1673.

88.

On August 15, 2012, WCF, through attorney Moffitt, filed its blanket motion to
recuse Hann in all its cases at the Commission, attaching the still private bar
complaint, R. Prof. Conduct 14-515, serving the Director of Adjudication, but not
opposing counsel. Findings, ¶ 53, R. 1033, Moffit, Lloyd, R. 1298, Resp. Ex. 63,
70. WCF’s concern was lack of transparency. The Commission granted the
motion in two days, without prior notice to the other parties in the affected cases.
Findings, ¶ 54, R. 1034, Resp. Ex. 65, Moffitt, R. 1609-11.

89.

Commission ALJ Luke expressed to Commissioner Hayashi she was “awake all
night” over WCF’s blanket recusal. Not only had she never seen one before, but
she had no notice until a transferred case landed on her desk. She complained the

5

OPC’s case against Debbie Hann is stayed pending outcome of this case because
the court found “underlying these actions are the same statute and ALJ policy at issue in
LaJeunesse.” Addendum Ex. 4, In re Discipline of Debbie Hann, Bar No. 5077, Case No.
130905705, Ruling and Order Granting Stay, Addendum, Ex. 5, Complaint, In re Hann.
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process was not transparent. Hayashi, R. 1814, 1869-71.
90.

Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson, workers compensation defense, joined the
effort, emailing Hayashi “to recuse [Hann] from WCF cases and not Blackburn
and RBMN cases . . . does not seem right.” Resp. Ex. 71, Bates 231-2. Petersen
seemed envious of WCF’s recusal when she wrote Miller “[b]et you’re enjoying
your holiday from Judge Hann!” Resp. Ex. 76, Petersen, R. 1735.

91.

The Commission never informed Burke of the motion to recuse, instead providing
him an alternative explanation: that his case had been reassigned because his
name had been disclosed in LaJeunesse’s witness list in the instant action. Burke
expressed concern at trial that by agreeing to tell the truth for either party in the
instant action, he had somehow gotten on the wrong side of things at the
Commission. Burke, R. 2055-8, Miller, R. 1700-1.

92.

Commissioner Hayashi had multiple ex parte non-transparent communications
with a pro se injured worker litigant without entering the communications in the
SPUD case management system or disclosing her contacts with defense counsel.
Hayashi, R. 1954-5.

93.

On at least one occasion, counsel for Hayashi, who writes her opinions on appeal,
had an ex parte non-transparent communication with defense counsel Petersen on
the Duheric matter. Petersen, R. 1750-1.

94.

Burke testified that the process of administration of justice at the Commission has
not improved since LaJeunesse was fired because LaJeunesse was one of the most
29

efficient and productive judges at the Commission, and delay hurts his clients.
Burke, R. 2052-4, 2057.
95.

Physician Dr. Thomas still speaks with ALJs at the Commission, but does not feel
like he gets any help, making the work unpleasant. Thomas, R. 2127-8.

96.

The current system of distributing flawed reports caused appeal and remand with
assignment to a new medical panel (at least once), creating unfairness to parties by
delays. Delay causes harm to carrier paying interest or worker whose treatment is
delayed. Holley, R. 2159-60.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
OPC did not carry its burden to prove the Findings of Fact clearly erroneous or

show the court’s legal analysis was incorrect.
ARGUMENT
Point I.

OPC’s Brief should be stricken.

Judge Stone, heard testimony of fifteen witnesses over five days, and received over
seventy exhibits in this attorney discipline case. OPC conceded, and the court dismissed,
allegations that LaJeunesse did not have knowledge of any report being shredded or of
any alterations to the database until after the fact. R. 2005-2040, Complaint ¶ 12. At
close of trial, the court was fully briefed on the merits and took the matter under
advisement for nineteen days, issuing its nineteen page decision containing sixty-one
Findings of Fact and thirty-two Conclusions of Law. Addendum Ex. 1.
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OPC barely acknowledges the court’s ruling in its brief, arguing as if this Court
were in de novo proceedings. OPC does not append this ruling, in violation of Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(11)(C). In stating the standard of review, OPC omits its key burden to
marshal the evidence supporting any finding it seeks this Court to overrule, and to
demonstrate why the finding is clearly erroneous, as is required by Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). See In re Pendleton, 2000 UT 77, ¶¶ 20, 58, 11 P.3d 284, 287, 299.
OPC does not cite to the record to show where its issues were preserved below, as
required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), or in the alternative, articulate grounds for
seeking review of issues not preserved in the trial court under Utah R. App. 24(a)(5)(B).
Nor does OPC cite to the record in support of numerous factual assertions in its brief,
particularly in the argument section. This violates Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7), (a)(9) and
(e).
While this Court has tempered the marshaling requirement, State v. Nielsen, 2014
UT 10, ¶ 41, 326 P.3d 645, 653, and has broader discretion in appeals from attorney
discipline proceedings, Office of Professional Conduct v. Barrett, 2017 UT 10, ¶ 11, this
Court is not the depository wherein a party may dump its burdens of appellate advocacy.
Cf., e.g., Hi-Country Prop. Rights Group v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ¶¶ 13-14, 304 P.3d 851,
854-5 (district court exceeded breathing room in deferential standard of review).
As a result of OPC’s failure to marshal the evidence, this Court need not reach the
merits of OPC’s argument. Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2010 UT 43, ¶ 19, 233 P.3d 489,
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494. As a result of its failure to comply with rule 24, this Court may strike or disregard
OPC’s brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(k).
Point II.

OPC failed to identify flaws in the district court’s order requiring
reversal.

This Court presumes the district court’s findings of fact are correct. Barrett, 2017
UT 10, ¶ 11. OPC asserts its own version of facts on appeal, often without support, rather
than analyzing the detailed Findings of the court. E.g., OPC asserts LaJeunesse’s conduct
violated “statute and policies”, OPC.Brief, I, at 12-19, yet instead addresses past practice,
lack of transparency, and only a portion of the relevant statute.
A.

Deviation from past practice does not constitute a violation of Rule
8.4(d).

OPC asserts that deviation from practice at the Commission, before and after
LaJeunesse’s conduct, of distributing flawed reports, constitutes violation of Rule 8.4(d).
OPC.Brief, I, II, at 13-14, 20-21. OPC cites no law prohibiting departure from practice.
Past practice does not morph into policy. Johnston, ¶ 22, Facts, ¶ 54.
Lawyers and judges necessarily rely on creative or new interpretations of the law.
Concl.Law, ¶ 24, R. 1041. Even if LaJeunesse’s interpretation of the statute were
erroneous, Worthen, 926 P.2d at 868-9, informs that “a judge has not behaved improperly
simply because he has committed an error.” Although Worthen applied to a judge rather
than an ALJ, reliance on interpretation of law in the role of adjudication applies here. In
Worthen, this Court held that the “disciplinary process must concern itself only with those
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who behave outside the ethical norms set for judges. . . .” Id., Concl.Law, ¶ 25, R. 10412. OPC introduced no testimony, expert or otherwise, that LaJeunesse or Hann acted
outside their adjudicatory roles or expertise in the field, and the court found that all of
LaJeunesse’s acts were within his role as an ALJ. Facts, ¶¶ 8-10, Concl.Law, ¶ 30, R.
1043.
OPC ignores that LaJeunesse tried to solve problems of administering adjudicative
duties by attending to procedural concerns rather than allowing the inefficiencies to
continue to avoid needless litigation over obvious flaws in reports. Facts, ¶¶ 31, 34-7, 48,
55, see also court comment, R. 2025.
B.

OPC’s assertion the statute did not require interpretation does not prove the
Findings are clearly erroneous.
OPC asserts that “other witnesses . . . testified that the statute did not require

interpretation,” as though this is sufficient to find error. OPC.Brief, II, at 20. OPC’s
unsupported assertion cannot suffice (no witness or statement referenced) under Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), (a)(9) to disprove the court’s finding that La Jeunesse “had a good
faith belief that his statutory interpretation permitting the return of a signed report to a
medical panel for technical revision was correct[]”, Findings, ¶ 25, R. 1030. As the court
stated, “[w]itnesses don’t come in and vote about the interpretation of the statute.”
“That’s my job.” R. 2019, 1289.
OPC fails to discuss subsection -601(2)(b), so important to LaJeunesse’s analysis,
and to the court’s Order of Dismissal (Order). Concl.Law, ¶¶ 5-6, R. 1036-7. The statute
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includes no methodology for correcting obvious flaws to the reports, but -601(2)(b)
allows “additional findings as the administrative law judge may require.” Rational minds
may reason that seeking clarifications is logically subsumed within, or at least consistent
with, seeking additional findings, as a reasonable interpretation of the law. See
Concl.Law, ¶ 7, R. 1037.
C.

OPC waived any challenge to the court’s finding that LaJeunesse’s analysis of
34A-2-601(2)(b) is correct.
LaJeunesse and Hann considered the statute paramount in their analysis to return

flawed medical panel reports to panelists. Facts, ¶¶ 41-7, Concl.Law, ¶¶ 2-8, R. 1035-7.
OPC ignores subsection -601(2)(b) in its entirety, and asserted at trial statutory
interpretation did not control. Facts, ¶ 71, Townsend, R. 2170, 2177, OPC.Brief at 2
(Determinative Law Section omits §34A-2-304(2)(b) or even the entire statute),
OPC.Brief, Fact 5, thus OPC cannot show the court’s Order is clearly erroneous. OPC’s
assertion, OPC.Brief at 19, that LaJeunesse “devised a plan that was contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute” fails because it does not examine the statue as a whole, and is
devoid of analysis of a significant portion of the statute – section (2)(b). The entire
statutory scheme is paramount in giving effect to legislative intent. Hertzske v. Snyder,
2017 UT 4, ¶¶ 9-10.
The court correctly concluded LaJeunesse’s view of the statute, that under
subsection (2)(b), the legislature authorized the ALJ to seek additional findings and to
make sure the report was in proper form prior to promptly distributing the report under 34

601(2)(d) is correct. Seeking clarifications to panel reports falls logically within
adjudicatory discretion. Concl.Law, ¶¶ 2-5, R. 1035-6, Facts, ¶¶ 37-42, 44-5.
Even assuming this Court elects to search beyond OPC’s Brief, the statute does not
require notice of requests for clarification, and no appellate court had interpreted that
aspect of the statute. Facts, ¶¶ 46-7. Additional justifications for LaJeunesse’s
interpretation are the flexible standard specifically authorized by statute, and the
requirement to focus on merits over procedure when possible. Evidentiary and procedural
arguments run counter to the spirit and intent underlying the workers’ compensation
adjudicative process. Utah Code §34A-2-802, Kallas v. U.S. Steel, Facts, ¶ 11.
OPC failed to address §34A-2-601(2)(b), §34A-2-802, standards approved in
Kallas, or prove the court’s findings are clearly erroneous through marshaling; it has
waived any challenge to interpretation of -601(2)(b); and the Order should be upheld.
D.

Reliance on the Governor’s Audit, Commission’s Public Report and the
Medical Panel Process Summary do not amount to flaws in the Order
requiring reversal.
OPC relies on the Audit, OPC.Brief at 14-5, the Commission’s Public Report

(Report), OPC.Brief at 15, and the Process Summary (Resp Ex. 8 (used to train the
medical panel)), rather than distinguishing the Findings as clearly erroneous. The court
largely cites to the Audit for the number of cases involved, and the fact that no other
judges at the Commission had tried this new method, which LaJeunesse does not dispute.
Findings, ¶ 45. The Audit was “remarkably vague” because it refers to “questionable
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communications”. The court, R. 1812. OPC fails to marshal any evidence helpful to this
Court’s analysis arising from the Audit. Hayashi’s Report parroted the Audit, but noted
“it did not appear that [the ALJs] intended to influence the panels’ ultimate opinions, but,
rather, wanted the medical panels to clarify their conclusions.” Pet. Ex. 107, Findings, ¶
29, R. 1043. The Process Summary supports LaJeunesse’s conduct because it invites the
panel to “decisively answer only the questions asked,” “feel free to contact the judge
concerning any questions about the Medical Panel Referral,” rely on specific Guides, and
return the report to the referring judge. Hayashi, R. 1844-5, Resp. Ex. 8.
Sources cited by OPC are insufficient to prove the court’s Findings clearly
erroneous, or that the court’s legal analysis was incorrect.
E.

The court did not base its Findings solely on the “self serving” testimony of
LaJeunesse.
OPC’s assertion, OPC.Brief, II, at 20, that the court found “LaJeunesse’s

interpretation was in ‘good faith’ [Findings ¶ 25, R. 1041-2] even though the only
evidence presented at trial on this issue was LaJeunesse’s own self serving testimony” is
contrary to trial testimony and without citation to the record in violation of Utah R. Civ.
P. 24(a)(5)(A), (a)(9), treating this instead as a de novo review (but without support).
OPC ignores testimony of ALJ Holley (sending flawed reports to the parties has not
resolved the issue), Facts, ¶ 96; attorneys Burke (whose client was harmed by aftermath
of the blanket recusal), Facts, ¶ 81; Atkin (LaJeunesse brought standards of quality to the
Division), Facts, ¶ 5; Scalley (they lost the two best judges at the Division), Facts, ¶ 50;
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Acosta (the changes to her case were insignificant), Facts, ¶ 7; Petersen (“[i]f it were
anybody but Judge Hann, I probably wouldn’t think much about this, but it’s Judge
Hann[]”), Facts, ¶ 57, Dr. Thomas (the ALJs made no effort to influence any of his
medical decisions), Facts, ¶ 61; or Dr. Rosen (he made no significant changes to his
medical conclusions in Duheric, Boyt), Facts ¶¶ 52-3.
OPC has failed to sufficiently refute the record or identify flaws in the Order
requiring reversal.
F.

LaJeunesse did not devise a plan contrary to the statute.
OPC urges this Court to find LaJeunesse devised a plan contrary to the statute, but

fails to: examine -601(2)(b), LaJeunesse’s administrative and judicial roles, or even
recognize the adjudicative role to interpret statutes within the bounds of legislation.
Agencies are allowed to administer portions of the code. Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v.
Utah Tax Comm’n, 845 P.2d 266, 268 n.5 (UT App 1993). It is improper for OPC to
cherry pick only subsection -601(2)(d) when the court analyzed, and LaJeunesse relied
upon, subsection -601(2)(b) and the statute as a whole. Hertzske, 2017 UT 4, ¶ 10.
OPC disagrees with LaJeunesse and Hann, but fails to articulate why – when the
ALJ can request additional findings under (2)(b), and why – when the medical panel shall
make a report to the administrative law judge in proper form under (2)(b), LaJeunesse, as
Director of Adjudication, and Hann, as Assistant Director, could not request clarifications
without saving the signed report or providing notice under reasonable statutory
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interpretation.
OPC failed to support its assertion LaJeunesse’s conduct was in violation of the
entire statutory scheme as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), (a)(9). OPC.Brief III
at 22. OPC asserts de novo LaJeunesse’s interpretation was incorrect, but its burden here
is to show why the court’s Findings or conclusions are erroneous. Concl.Law, ¶ 4, R.
1036.
G.

OPC’s assertion that only conduct is necessary fails to account for legal error.
OPC asserts no mens rea is necessary for a violation of Rule 8.4(d). OPC.Brief at

21. This analysis fails to account for legal error, and the instructive language of Worthen,
926 P.2d at 868-9, requiring, in the case of judges, something outside the ethical norms
set for judges or “unjudicial conduct” for there to be an ethical violation. Concl.Law, ¶¶
25-6, 29, R. 1041-3. The court correctly concluded that “an objectively reasonable
position taken in good faith by an ALJ in fulfillment of his or her duties cannot support a
claim that the conduct taken as a result is a violation of Rule 8.4(d).” Concl.Law, ¶¶ 3031, R. 1043-4.
H.

Cases cited by OPC in support of Rule 8.4(d) violation are inapposite and not
controlling.
OPC cites numerous cases referencing violations of Rule 8.4(d), as though they

alone should carry the day, but none apply here. OPC.Brief at 16-8. None are Utah
cases. Additionally, in In re Swarts, III, ¶¶ 7, 28-9, 30-42, 30 P.3d 1011, 1014,1017-9,
(Kan. 2001), the attorney caused uncertainty rising to level of conduct prejudicial to
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administration of justice because attorney’s stance in favor of corporal punishment
(paddlings in courthouse) contradicted social services view. Swarts also manufactured
evidence, violated ex parte rules, argued against reducing bond (Hispanic defendant
(American citizen) might travel to Mexico and blend in); shouted to African American
teen “Do you think slavery is over?”; and, inter alia, commented everyone would be better
off if fourteen year old committed suicide (he would show her how).
In In re Bankston, 810 So.2d 1113, 1114 (La. 2002), the attorney was convicted of
receiving a bribe, fined, and sentenced to prison; in In re Schwehm, 860 So.2d 1108,
1109, (La. 2003), the Justice of the Peace assessed and collected fines without remitting
them, was convicted of malfeasance in office, and sentenced to serve years at hard labor.
In In re Darlene Mears, 723 N.E.2d 873, 875-6 (Ind. 2000), a judge had staff perform
personal favors while on public payroll (including taking child to after-hours birthday
party); in Disciplinary Counsel v. Robinson, 933 N.E.2d 1095, 1097, 1100-01 (Ohio
2010), the attorney gave false and misleading testimony by removing and possessing firm
documents on the same day he testified he did not possess them; and in Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. White, 731 A.2d 447 (Md. 1999), the attorney lied under oath,
perjured herself, and destroyed discoverable and relevant evidence.
The cases cited by OPC, involving egregious acts, often on multiple occasions,
sometimes with criminal convictions, are entirely dissimilar to LaJeunesse’s good faith
interpretation of the law and decision to try a new approach to resolve ongoing problems.
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Point III.

OPC failed to preserve its new issue that the court failed to properly
assess LaJeunesse’s termination.

OPC now asserts, for the first time, that the court incorrectly failed to assess
LaJeunesse’s termination for “violat[ing] the statute and policies of his Division”.
OPC.Brief, I at 12. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A) requires preservation in the trial court or
(B) grounds for review of issue not preserved. OPC cites neither. LaJeunesse had no
notice in the Complaint to defend on grounds of termination. Even if he had notice, he
served at will, and was rehired by the Commissioner. LaJeunesse R. 1250-1, Facts, ¶ 85.
To preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must have been presented and developed in the
trial court, 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801, 813, and issues
not raised at trial are generally waived. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847
(Utah 1998).
Point IV:

OPC’s assertion that lack of transparency violates Rule 8.4(d) is
without merit.

OPC, OPC.Brief at 15, 19, asserts Commissioner findings control, rather than
proving the court erred in concluding OPC’s view of transparency “stems from its
improper view of the medical panel as a separate decision maker.” Concl.Law, ¶ 17, R.
1039-40. The panel is adjunct. Facts, ¶ 15.
Even assuming Commission’s findings were the issue, the Commission’s first
policy on transparency was not written until after the events in question, Facts, ¶ 72, and
the Commission did not promote transparency until after the events in question. Facts, ¶¶
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88-9, 91-3. Examples of Commission’s failure to promote transparency include the
Commission granting WCF’s ex parte blanket motion to recuse Judge Hann in two days
with no hearing or notice to opposing parties, Facts, ¶ 88; and delaying and transferring
one of Mr. Burke’s cases pursuant to defense complaints about being unfairly saddled
with Judge Hann, without notice or opportunity for Burke to respond. Facts, ¶¶ 90-1.
Hayashi refused to even share with ALJ Luke the reasons for a case reassignment as a
result of the blanket recusal, Facts, ¶ 89, and admitted to failing to disclose multiple ex
parte contacts with a pro se injured worker in the record or to opposing counsel. Facts, ¶
92. Commission counsel Hennebold had ex parte contact with attorney Petersen on the
Duheric matter. Facts, ¶ 93.
Even if transparency were controlling, the court considered Hennebold’s and
Hayashi’s concern about lack of transparency, Findings, ¶¶ 41, 48, R. 1032-3, explaining
that requiring transparency may inhibit free communication between the ALJs and their
assistants. Concl.Law, ¶ 17, R. 1039. Further, the statute did not require restriction of
communication between the panels and the adjudicators, id., nor did any existing statute
or policy, formal or informal, prohibit communications or require disclosure. Concl.Law,
¶ 18, R. 1040.
There was no testimony that La Jeunesse instructed or authorized Hann not to
disclose the communications, and the preponderance of evidence showed the purpose of
the communications was to conform the opinions to the appropriate legal framework.
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Concl.Law, ¶ 21, R. 1040-1, Facts, ¶¶ 51-3. OPC has failed to show the ruling is clearly
erroneous because (1) there was no policy on transparency, (2) agency norms did not toe
the mark on transparency, and (3) no statue or policy required disclosure of
communications. OPC’s reliance on transparency is flawed and insufficient to support
reversal.
Point V.

OPC errs in concluding the court found statutory interpretation
determinative as to whether LaJeunesse violated Rule 8.4(d).

The court found attorneys and judges interpret laws all the time. Concl.Law, ¶ 24,
R. 1041. Even if OPC’s theory were correct, OPC.Brief, II, at 20, and supported by the
record (it is not), under Worthen, the court reasoned, something more than legal error is
required, such as conduct outside the ethical norms, something akin to “unjudicial
conduct”. Findings, ¶¶ 25, 29, R. 1042-3. OPC was unable to prove delay (possible
support for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Concl.Law, ¶ 27,
R.1042, see Facts ¶¶ 30, 32, 43-5, 48, 50-51 (supporting LaJeunesse’s adjudicative
reasoning and institutional knowledge).
The court cited comments to Rule 8.4 in support of its ruling, Concl.Law, ¶ 28, R.
1042-3, and the court found that LaJeunesse’s objectively reasonable interpretation was
insufficient to support a violation of Rule 8.4(d). Concl.Law, ¶ 30, R. 1043-4, Facts ¶ 45.
The court examined not only the rule, but the statute, the conduct, circumstances, and
case law. OPC refutes none of these, or the Findings, support its argument as required
by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), (a)(9).
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For example, OPC asserts the “[c]ourt’s conclusion that there is no rule violation
seems inconsistent with the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline[]”, OPC.Brief at
21, referencing the Commission’s vague pronouncement of “violation of statutes and
polices.” Id. OPC cites to no particular Standard in this section of its brief,6 nor does it
refute any of the court’s Findings in support of its position that the “Court’s finding of
‘good faith’ should have been used . . . to determine [LaJeunesse’s] mental state, after
finding that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id.
Even if we were to assume, and we cannot, that OPC is referencing Rule 14-604
(Factors to be Considered in Imposing Sanctions), there would have to have been a
finding of misconduct. OPC’s assertion seems no more than an unsupported difference of
opinion. See Cf. e.g., State of Utah v. Steed, 2017 UT App 6, ¶ 9 (“[a]n issue is not ripe
for appeal if there exists no more than a difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical
application of [law] to a situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find
themselves.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). OPC failed to meet its
burden to brief the issue. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), (a)(9), Cf., e.g., Hi-Country Prop.
Rights Group, 2013 UT 33, ¶¶ 13-14.
Point VI.

The court correctly found ALJ LaJeunesse did not commit conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Benjamin N. Cardozo, LL.D. lectured that the:

6

OPC cites Standards R. 14-601(Definitions) and 14-607(Aggravation and
Mitigation) in Point IV at 22.
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strange compound which is brewed daily in the caldron of the courts. . .
[does] not render the judge superfluous, nor his work perfunctory and
mechanical. [F]orces . . . . may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing
the line at another angle, of staking the path along new courses, of marking
a new point of departure. . . . Insignificant is the power of innovation of any
judge, when compared with the bulk and pressure of the rules that hedge
him on every side. . . .
Cardozo, B. The Nature of the Judicial Process, Lectures I-IV (1921). Judge LaJeunesse
never stepped outside these bounds, nor was his conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice.
OPC asserts, OPC.Brief, III at 22 that “[e]ven if the court’s decision to use
statutory interpretation to dispose of the case, LaJeunesse’s interpretation of the statute
was incorrect.” LaJeunesse addressed statutory interpretation at supra Point II(B), (C),
(F), Point V, pp. 33-5, 37-8, 42-3, and lack of any Commission policy on transparency at
Facts, ¶ 72. OPC ignores that subsection -601(2)(b)(i), (ii) allows for additional findings,
requires the report to be written to the judge, and requires the report be in proper form.
LaJeunesse and Hann intended to use the statute to clarify flawed reports to
address concerns and criticisms by making sure reports had the correct legal framework
so reports could be used for rulings. Facts, ¶¶ 43-5. Even the Commissioner determined
“they were motivated by a desire to have the medical panels clarify their conclusions.”
Findings, R. 1030, ¶ 29, Pet. Ex. 107, Facts, ¶ 58. OPC has thus failed to prove the
court’s finding there was no “misconduct” clearly erroneous, nor has it otherwise assisted
this Court by marshaling the evidence supporting any finding it seeks this Court to
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overrule.
Point VII .

OPC errs in seeking public reprimand. OPC.Brief, IV at 22.

On its face, there cannot be conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
under Rule 8.4(d) without a showing of prejudice.
OPC attempts to support its theory of prejudice by mistakenly asserting
“[s]takeholders were . . . affected in that they did not receive reports[]”, OPC.Brief at 17,
but all reports were retrieved and distributed. Facts, ¶ 73. Even if this were not true,
LaJeunesse was placed on leave before he could complete the retrievals. Facts, ¶ 74.
OPC alternatively asserts the costs of investigation caused harm. If the costs of an
investigation alone support “harm”, then any allegation (which reasonably should be
investigated) would support violation of Rule 8.4(d).
The “costs of investigation alone” theory ignores that the statute requires the report
to be sent to the ALJ and that the ALJ has discretion under -601(2)(b). Concl.Law, ¶ 8,
R. 1037.
The “costs of investigation alone” theory cannot be examined in a vacuum.
Commissioner Hayashi, who called for the investigation, was unfamiliar with the statutes,
training issues, or even decisions she had authored. Facts, ¶¶ 11, 19. Had Hayashi been
knowledgeable, she might have agreed with the ALJs’ statutory interpretation, thereby
resolving the issue with no need for further investigation. No court had ruled otherwise.
Hayashi could have just as easily directed LaJeunesse to write a policy notifying all
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parties that medical panel reports would not be distributed unless they were in proper
form per the Division’s determination, and that there would be no further notice of
iterations or clarifications to reports. Hayashi could have waited to see if any parties
appealed, thus perhaps allowing an appellate court to resolve interpretation of the statute;
or she could have assured stakeholders that no one claimed error since no parties
appealed. She could have attempted to reach a consensus among the remaining ALJs.
Taking any of these actions would have avoided the harm caused by the Commission’s
reaction, delays caused by the Commission’s recusals, and any costs of investigation.7
Neither LaJeunesse nor Hann made any effort to change any medical opinion, nor
was there any evidence of substantive changes to any of the reports, Facts, ¶¶ 50, 59-60,
Findings, ¶¶ 26, 29, 34-7, R. 1030-2, nor was there any evidence the changes did not
address legitimate concerns over the legal form of the reports. Findings, ¶ 37, R. 1032,
Facts, ¶¶ 51-3.
The fact that no party appealed (as far as LaJeunesse knows), when the
Commission has a very easy and liberal appeal process (no filing fee, no requirement for
transcripts, no expense to parties, informal letter may suffice) additionally refutes OPC’s
claim of harm. Facts, ¶ 80, LaJeunesse, R. 1553-4.

7

If LaJeunesse prevails on appeal, members of the Bar could arguably assert harm
from the costs of prosecution; and the court wondered if he agreed with LaJeunesse
whether he could be exposed to possible rule violation. R. 2038. OPC thus
oversimplifies the notions of cost as supportive of conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice because it is a double-edged sword.
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OPC cites no cases where an attorney was found in violation of rule 8.4(d) for
approval of ex parte communications with an adjunct expert.
The disciplinary cases OPC cites in support of its theory of violation of Rule 8.4(d)
are inapposite and not controlling. OPC.Brief at 16-8, see supra, Point II(H), pp. 38-9.
Point VIII. WCF incorrectly interprets 34A-2-601 as though it is on agency appeal.
This Court granted WCF permission to file an amicus curie brief on the issues of
the function of the panels and interpretation and requirements of §34A-2-601. However,
rather than briefing these issues as a friend of the court, as the name amicus implies, it reasserts itself into litigation as an advocate. Its arguments should therefore be stricken.
WCF was the complaining witness, filing bar complaints against LaJeunesse and
Hann. Its attorneys and former attorneys Lloyd (senior vice president and chief legal
officer and lobbyist for WCF), R. 1280, Scheffler, vice president of legal department at
WCF, R. 1582, Moffitt, WCF’s former counsel, R. 1598, Miller, attorney for WCF, R.
1647 testified for OPC at trial. None of them analyzed subsection (2)(b) of the statute,
and Miller and Moffitt’s concerns were lack of transparency. See ¶¶ Facts, 86, 88. WCF
succeeded in removing Judge Hann on all its cases, after making “an early run at Judge
Hann when she was two months in to being a judge and tried to get her disqualified from
all their cases.” LaJeunesse, R. 1574-5, Facts, ¶ 88. WCF is continuing to litigate as an
advocate after it lost in court by cloaking itself with the mantle of amicus curiae.
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Point IX.

The court’s ruling on the statute is not binding on the Commission.

WCF incorrectly asserts the court’s ruling as binding on parties appearing before
the Commission (it “would deprive parties in a Labor Commission proceeding of their
statutory right to object.” WCF.Brief at 11), avoiding the issue actually litigated:
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The precedential value of the ruling
would only pertain if another ALJ at the Commission acted on a new interpretation of the
statute. WCF is incorrect because parties can still object – the court did not rule
otherwise. Further, given the chilling effect of this case, it is unlikely any other ALJ will
risk new interpretations of any law in an effort to improve efficiency within an agency.
LaJeunesse had his “reputation smeared,” and “besmirched” and has spent tens of
thousands of dollars defending against the accusations. R. 1192, 1236.
Point X.

WCF fails to distinguish adjudicatory duties.

The court made a narrow ruling regarding the statute, because it had only to find
that LaJeunesse made an objectively reasonable interpretation in support of its finding
there was no conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The court found that
LaJeunesse’s “actions were either legally permitted or at least did not violate any express
statute or policy.” Concl.Law ¶¶ 30-1, R. 1043-4, Facts, ¶¶ 8-10. WCF fails to
distinguish Worthen, 926 P.2d at 868. WCF fails to distinguish OPC’s position (during
the trial) that the statute was not at issue for Rule 8.4(d). Two of WCF’s own attorneys
asserted lack of transparency was the issue. Facts, ¶ 88.
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The case before this Court is whether there was conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice. The issue of statutory interpretation is limited to whether
LaJeunesse’s actions were legally permitted based upon LaJeunesse’s interpretations and
rationale – not WCF’s interpretations.
Point XI.

WCF incorrectly re-inserts itself into the process as an advocate.

WCF argues statutory interpretations here, but as a party to the Swenson matter,
one of the five cases at the Commission, WCF could have appealed once it learned of
LaJeunesse and Hann’s acts, yet slept on its right to appeal.8 Complaint, ¶¶ 15-16,
Findings, ¶ 34, Facts ¶¶ 77, 80. Such an appeal would have allowed full appellate review
of the statutory interpretation under the facts of the case. WCF’s passivity at the
Commission should not be rewarded by appellate advocacy here. State of Utah v. Steed,
2017 UT App 6, ¶ 9 (mere difference of opinion of hypothetical application does not
support appeal), see also Clayton v. Dinwoodey et al., 93 P. 723, 726 (Utah 1908) (“[t]he
party holding the claim . . . must pursue some measures to present his demand, and not
remain passive, or sleep upon his right.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
///

8

WCF asked the original report be “eliminated from the record”, a position at
complete odds with its assertion here that lack of notice violated notions of transparency.
Facts, ¶ 77.
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Point XII.

WCF’s assessment of the purpose of medical panels as independent is
flawed.

WCF relies on Lloyd, an attorney and lobbyist for WCF to describe the purpose of
medical panels. Lloyd considered only subsection -601(2)(d) of the statute when he filed
the Bar Complaint, R. 1289-90, not subsection (2)(b), critical to LaJeunesse’s reasoning,
the court’s ruling, and this Court’s analysis. Now, WCF argues subsection (2)(b).
WCF.Brief, II(A), III at 15-6, 20-22.
Lloyd did not believe the medical panels are adjunct to the ALJs (R. 01335-7, R.
1281), despite case law to the contrary. Facts, ¶¶ 15-16 and citations therein. Lloyd was
unaware of any definition for “proper form” at trial, R. 1335, and failed to take into
account that Commissioner Hayashi accepted Hann’s explanation that she was trying to
get the reports in proper form when Lloyd filed the bar complaint. R. 1351, Resp. Ex. 59,
Bates 200. When asked about the significance of the report being in proper form, Lloyd
responded that only subsection (2)(d) was relevant to the bar complaint, R. 1305.
WCF now, for the first time, as does OPC, advocates interpretation of (2)(b),
WCF.Brief, III at 20-27, but this is not a de novo proceeding.
Point XIII. WCF’s analysis ignores the salient point that the report is written to
the ALJ.
WCF ignored -601(2)(b) in its bar complaint, Facts, ¶ 86, and now ignores
discussion of the statutory requirement that the report must be submitted to the ALJ in its
section on history, focusing instead on the language “promptly” under -601(2)(d), and
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other components of -601(2)(b)(i) (“form prescribed”) and (ii) (“additional findings. . .
.”). This Court cannot harmonize relevant sections of the entire statute while reviewing
only select portions. Cf., e.g., Hertzske v. Snyder, ¶ 10, Murray v. Utah Labor Comm’n,
2013 UT 38, ¶ 16, 308 P.3d 461, 467 (each part of statute construed to produce
harmonious whole) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Though the word “promptly” has floated through the statute for decades, this does
not refute that the report is written to the ALJ nor does it refute that the ALJ may request
additional findings and check the form of the report under (2)(b). Johnston, 2013 UT
App 179, ¶ 13. Since WCF advocates here, the correctness standard of the court’s ruling
applies. Id. The history of “promptly” is not conclusive under the correctness standard,
Cf., Id, because this Court must harmonize relevant sections of the entire statute.
Hertzske, ¶ 10.
Point XIV.

Section 34A-2-601 grants the ALJ discretion to act without notice to the
parties.

WCF fails to recognize adjudicatory discretion under -601(2)(b). WCF.Brief, III.
Cf., e.g., Johnston, ¶ 15 (abuse of discretion standard applies to Labor Commission),
Facts ¶¶ 8-10, see Worthen, 926 P.2d at 868-9. The statute is silent on notice, but
recognizes discretion in allowing the ALJ for example, to request additional findings.
WCF ignores that the statute has taken on additional meaning through case law, including
that ALJs must provide interim orders. Resp. Ex. 2 (template letter), 8 (Process
Summary), 22 (Training Agendas), LaJeunesse R. 1189, see Price River, 731 P.2d at
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1083-4.
WCF failed to address public policy concerns: that harm could befall a pro-se
litigant (who is unable to object to a flawed report which could be admitted into
evidence), or conversely a windfall to an insurer or employer, or the inefficiencies that
result when flawed reports are returned for objections to be made so the report can then
be resubmitted to the panel. See Concl.Law ¶ 16, R. 1039 (quotation marks omitted).
Agencies must administer portions of the code. Belnorth, 845 P.2d at 268 n.5.
ALJs carry out policy making, regulatory and enforcement powers, rights, duties under
Title 34. Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-104 (LexisNexis 2011). ALJs are not bound by the
usual common law or statutory rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules or
procedure under section 34A-2-802, and the standard of placing merits over procedure
when possible applies at the Commission. See, e.g., Kallas v. US Steel. Legislative intent
is determined by using both the plain language and the function within the context of the
entire statutory scheme, thus adjudicatory discretion must be included in statutory
analysis. Hertzske, ¶ 9. The court considered these factors, WCF does not. As the court
stated, correcting errors is not specifically written in the statute but the ALJ’s
interpretation was correct. Concl.Law, ¶¶ 6-7. R. 1036-7.
A.

WCF erroneously invents a new duty.

WCF, WCF.Brief, III(A), at 21-4, invents a requirement for the medical panel to
write a report which conforms to an imaginary form the Division has already prescribed.
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WCF seems to assert “form prescribed by the Division of Adjudication” means a template
form, (guidelines should be established before the report’s completion, WCF.Brief at 22).
This notion overlooks that the entire process involves real people and unresolved medical
causation issues. On its face, assigning a duty of legal sufficiency to the physicians rather
than respecting the panel’s role to assist the judge on medical issues (thus leaving legal
framework to the ALJs) fails to recognize the panels as adjunct. Facts, ¶ 15, see, e.g., La
Jeunesse, R. 1201 (report must be in “proper form as required by adjudication”), R. 1256
(medical panel must address remaining medical issues still in dispute). It also overlooks
that the report is written to the ALJ under -601(2)(b)(i).
The medical panel’s role is limited by law and WCF cannot re-define it. The panel
may not act as factfinder, may not base its conclusions on facts not in evidence, generally
may not assess the claimant’s testimony, Intermountain Health Care, 839 P.2d at 846-7,
and must assess causation in definitive terms rather than probability. Facts, ¶¶ 51-3,
LaJeunesse, R. 1437. The clarifications assured reports were within known legal
parameters – this is the “form prescribed by law” that LaJeunesse aimed to achieve.
Facts, ¶¶ 43-5, 51, 55.
WCF’s grammatical analysis (“prescribed” is a “past participle”, therefore form
must have been previously prescribed, WCF.Brief at 22) omits the functionality of the
statute, the body of case law the ALJs used to assure reports were properly clarified, or
how, as a practical matter, such professional opinions of medical panels could possibly
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conform to WCF’s proposed concept. See also, Cardozo, B, “[i]nsignificant is the power
of innovation of any judge, when compared with the bulk and pressure of the rules that
hedge him in on every side. . . .” See Supra, Point VI, pp. 43-4. WCF’s analysis ignores
panel role of “adjunct” already developed through case law, ignores the report is written
to the ALJ, and ignores the complaints, largely driven by WCF, that LaJeunesse and Hann
attempted to address. Facts, ¶¶ 24, 31, 34-7, 48, 55, see also court comment, R. 2025.
WCF overlooks the Process Summary already in use as a guide when it asserts the
Division is “required to set forth clear guidelines prior to the report’s completion.”
WCF.Brief at 22. Facts, ¶¶ 19-20, Resp. Ex. 8, supra, Point II(D), pp. 35-6. WCF’s
guide notion ignores the statutory directive (“and additional findings as the [ALJ] may
require[]”) of §34A-2-601(2)(b)(ii).
B.

WCF incorrectly asserts LaJeunesse could not act for the Division.

WCF asserts that only the “Division of Adjudication,” (WCF.Brief, III(A) at 21-4)
can decide what having the report in a “form prescribed by the Division of Adjudication”
means. What is the Division if it is not the Director and his co-director ALJ Hann
especially when they could decide policy? See Facts ¶¶ 12-13. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2202(1)(e) provides the Commission creates the “the Division of Adjudication that shall
adjudicate claims.” Director LaJeunesse adjudicated claims under his duty to administer
the statute. Additionally, the statute does not exclude the Director from interpreting the
statute as WCF asserts. LaJeunesse worked within the parameters of a body of case law
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developed over decades, the statutes, his role as the Director of the Division and his role
as an ALJ. Facts ¶¶ 34-7, 43, supra, Point XIV, pp. 51-5.
WCF provides no support for its statement “there is nothing in the text or structure
of the Act to suggest the ALJ has discretion to police the form of the medical report[]”, in
light of statutory language allowing the ALJ to request additional findings or assure
proper form (-601)(2)(b)(i), (ii)). WCF simply disagrees with the meaning of proper form
as understood by La Jeunesse, Hann, Hayashi and the court. WCF’s creativity is
unfounded and not helpful to this Court’s analysis.
WCF’s reliance on practice as controlling is without merit. Johnston, ¶ 22, Facts ¶
54, See supra Point II(A), pp. 32-3.
Point XV.

Changes to the reports were not substantive. WCF.Brief, III(B).

WCF oversteps its bounds in going beyond its permission to brief on the function
of panels and interpretation and requirements of §34A-2-601.
Additionally, WCF is incorrect. The Commission, Facts, ¶¶ 58, 73, and Audit,
Facts, ¶ 50, found there were no substantive changes in four cases. Resp. Ex. 75.
LaJeunesse also testified about the lack of substantive changes, so did Drs. Rosen, R.
2041-2, and Thomas, R. 2125, and Acosta. Facts, ¶¶ 7, 50-3, 61, 77.
WCF erroneously believes the panels are independent when they are adjunct,
Facts ¶ 15, and misunderstands the legal responsibilities of the ALJs. WCF.Brief at 25,
Facts, ¶¶ 43-45. WCF ignores ALJ responsibility to train the panels, Facts, ¶¶ 19, 27-29,
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33-4, as well as the problems LaJeunesse attempted to address. Facts ¶¶ 27-32, 34, 37,
44-5.
WCF’s reliance on Plumb v. State of Utah, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990) is
misplaced. In Plumb, this Court found it was error to adopt the findings of the special
master after learning the parties had no notice that the special master was to review the
reasonableness of attorney fees – the exact opposite of what happened here – Hann did
not adopt the reports because they were legally flawed. Id. Additionally, parties received
template letters indicating what the panels were to address. Facts, ¶ 22.
In referencing Hayashi’s characterization, whether report should be in Word® or
WordPerfect® and whether panel should include certain medical information as
substantive, WCF misstates her testimony. WCF.Brief, III(B) at 26. Hayashi only
characterized the latter as possibly substantive, R. 1812. Not only is it clear from
Hayashi’s testimony she had no idea the question pertained to subsection (2)(b), but the
question posed, and thus Hayashi’s response, had no reference to the specific
clarifications requested, as WCF erroneously suggests. Facts, ¶ 50.
Point XVI.

WCF improperly selects convenient definitions. WCF.Brief, IV.

WCF’s reliance on dictionary definitions, WCF.Brief at 12-3, fails to account for
administering the statute, Belnorth, 845 P.2d at 268 n.5, which requires the report to be in
form prescribed . . . under subsection -601(2)(b) prior to its “prompt distribution” under
subsection -601(2)(d), and that reading the statute in the order it is written is a legitimate
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form of statutory interpretation; and it also ignores the plain language of the statute.
Esquivel, ¶ 24, LaJeunesse, R. 1518, 1566-7. Dictionary definitions “will often fail to
dictate ‘what meaning a word must bear in a particular context.’” Hi-Country Prop.
Rights, ¶¶ 17-19 (citations omitted).
WCF’s reliance on dictionary definitions is selective, and perhaps arbitrary.
WCF.Brief at 12-13, 25, 27-29. For example, Black’s Law Dictionary, (5 th ed. 1979)
defines “prompt delivery” as “[d]elivery as soon as possible, all things considered[,]” and,
under “promptly” states that “[t]he meaning . . . depends largely on the facts. . . , for what
is ‘prompt’ in one situation may not be considered such under other circumstances or
conditions.” Thus definitions contrary to WCF’s selections are readily available and
equally persuasive in support of LaJeunesse. In any event, the statute states “promptly”
not “immediately” and WCF cannot re-write the statute. WCF urges this Court to find
that “promptly” means “immediately” under -601(2)(d), but the statute does not state
“immediately.” WCF “may not rewrite the statute by interpreting it to read as it feels it
should have been written.” See e.g., Belnorth, 845 P.2d at 271.
Additionally, the plain language states that reports are written “to” the judges, who
are not mere conduits. WCF does not analyze why the reports are written to the judges.
This Court should consider the Commissioner’s acceptance that Hann’s intent was
to ensure the medical panel reports were finalized “in proper form under Section
601(2)(b).” Hayashi, R. 1880, Resp. Ex. 59, Bates 190.
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The concept of seeking clarifications, (see WCF.Brief at 22, “statute is silent about
propounding further questions. . . .”) is reasonably subsumed in the broader authority of
(2)(b) to seek additional findings, and therefore consistent with the court’s ruling. For
example, the “‘narrower issue of legal causation’ is properly determined by the ALJ
through ‘an analysis of the facts surrounding the injury and analysis of the connection
between the subsequent injury and the original compensable industrial injury.’”
Washington Co. School Dist. v. Labor Comm’n, 2013 UT App 205, ¶ 42, 309 P.3d 299
(citations omitted). Seeking clarifications reasonably falls within bounds of ALJ
authority.
WCF ignores that panels are “adjunct” to the ALJs. Facts, ¶ 15. No witness
refuted that communication between the panels and the ALJs was known and expected.
Under the concept of open communication, it seems a “distinction without a difference”
that Hann reviewed written reports and requested clarifications rather than verbally
discussing the same matters; or reviewing draft reports, as doctors had requested of
LaJeunesse.
Determination of benefits relies “heavily upon the Commission’s expertise in and
familiarity with the work environment[,]” traits LaJeunesse exemplified. Price River, 731
P.2d at 1084. WCF fails to consider the ALJs’ known and expected expertise.
WCF’s arguments are unfounded or inapplicable to the facts of the case.

58

Addendum
Exhibit 1

District Court Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

Addendum - 1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURl
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Discipline of :

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUS ONS OF LAW

Richard La Jeunesse, Bar No. 7408,
Respondent.

Case N ( . 130905706
Judge A~drew Stone

This case concerns attorney discipline. The Office of Professional C( nduct ("OPC")
seeks findings that Respondent Richard La Jeunesse ("La Jeunesse") violated Rule
8.4(D) of Utah's Rules of Professional Conduct by engaging "in con( uct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice." A bench trial was held Pebruary 22
through 26, 2016 and the Court now enters the following Findings 0" Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

Findings of Fact
Unless otherwise noted, the Court finds the following facts to have Deen shown by a
preponderance of the evidence:
1. La Jeunesse is an attorney licensed to practice law in the statE of Utah.

2. La Jeunesse has been a member of the Utah Bar since 1996.
3. He began his career as a hearing officer at the Labor Commis~ion in 1995,
becoming an administrative law judge ("ALI") in 2000. He bE came the Director
1

Addendum - 2

01026

of the Commission's Adjudication Division in 2001, and held that position
continuously until 2012.
4. As Director, La Jeunesse supervised other ALJs in the divisio ,including Debbie
Hann ("Hann").
5. The ALJs in the division hear contested claims for workers' c mpensation.
6. In many such cases, the ALJ appoints a medical panel to advi e the ALJ
regarding the contested medical issues in the case.
7. Typically, a workers' compensation claimant has a treating 0 other physician
who renders an opinion as to the origin and compensability f the claimed
injury.
8. The respondent in a contested workers' compensation case (

employer or

insurer) typically hires a physician as well, who may render competing opinion
regarding the injury. This is often rendered after an indepen ent medical
examination ("IME"), during which the defense physician pe forms an
examination of the claimant.
9. The ALJ may refer the medical aspects of the case to a medic panel. Utah Code
34A-2-601. Such referral is discretionary. Intermountain Healt Care, Inc. v. Bd. of
Review of Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 841,845 (Utah Ct. pp. 1992) states:
The function of the medical panel is to give the Commiss on "the
benefit of its diagnosis relating to those matters that are
particularly within the scope of its expertise." IGA Food F ir v.
Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). However, "the fin
responsibility of making the decision as to the issues in s ch a
proceeding is given to the Commission," id., and the me ical
panel may not take over this responsibility of the Comm· ssion. Id.
at 830 n. 4. Accord, Jensen v. United States Fuel Co., 424 P. d 440,
442 (Utah 1967). Thus, the role of the medical panel is on y "to
assist the administrative law judge in deciding whether edical
cause has been proven." Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial
731 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added).
2
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Id. 839 P.2d at 845 (footnotes omitted).
10. Medical panels are considered "adjunct" to the ALJ at the co mission level. La
Jeunesse introduced commission decisions, by multiple labor commissioners,
stating as much.
11. Prior to referring a case to a medical panel, the ALJ makes in rim findings. The
medical panel is bound by those factual findings:
It is not the role of the medical panel to resolve conflicts' the

factual evidence regarding the injured party's activities. .. the
Code places that responsibility solely on the Commissio . ... the
medical panel is only to take the facts as found by the
administrative law judge and consider them in light of it medical
expertise to assist the administrative law judge in decid' g
whether medical cause has been proven. The medical p el strays
beyond its province when it attempts to resolve factual d sputes,
and the administrative law judge improperly abdicates h s
function if he permits the panel to so act.

Price River Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 731 P.2d 1079, 1084 Utah 1986).
12. Contrastingly, the ALJ is not required to accept the medical p nel's conclusions if
"substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contr ry finding." Utah
Code § 34A-2-601.
13. The statute provides that the medical panel shall make:
i. A report in writing to the administrative law ju ge in a form
prescribed by the Division of Adjudication; an
ii. Additional findings as the administrative law j dge may require.
Utah Code § 34A-2-601(2)(b).
14. The statute also provides that
An administrative law judge shall promptly dis ribute full copies of
a report submitted to the administrative law ju ge under this
Subsection (2) by mail to
A) the applicant
3
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B) the employer
C) the employer's insurance carrier; an
D) an attorney employed by [the above]
Utah Code § 34A-2-601(2)(d).
15. Once the medical panel report is sent to the parties, the parti shave 20 days to
file objections to the report. If no objections are made, the re ort is "considered
admitted in evidence." Utah Code §34A-2-601(d)(iii). If obje ions are made the
ALJ may set a hearing. In practice, such hearings are almost ever held. The ALJ
ordinarily rules on the objections and decides what portions f the report to
admit and rely on.
16. Medical panels are compensated by the commission.
17. Recruitment and training of the medical panels is the respon ibility of the
Director of Adjudication (at all relevant times here, La Jeunes e).
18. The quality of medical reports provided by the medical pane s to the ALJ s has
long been a source of complaint among practitioners before t e labor commission
and the ALJs.
19. Typical complaints regarding the panel reports are that they ssume facts
beyond or contrary to the interim findings, or that opinions a e phrased in terms
of percentages instead of legally required conclusions.
20. Training was offered to the medical panel participants on an pproximately
annual basis. In addition, La Jeunesse would attempt to prov de training to
individual physicians as they came on.
21. It was not uncommon for ALJs to discuss cases pending befo e medical panels
with members of those panels. The form referral letter invite such
correspondence. It was common at annual training sessions r doctors to raise
questions regarding pending cases.
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22. Complaints about the medical panel reports became particul rly intense in late
2011.
23. In January 2012, La Jeunesse discussed with Hann whether

e statute permitted

the ALJ to reject a report and request changes to its form in 0 der to comply with
the legal requirements applicable to medical reports.
24. La Jeunesse testified that he reached the conclusion that such a determination lay
within the ALI's discretion, and agreed with ALJ Hann that s e could do so.
25. The Court finds that La Jeunesse had a good faith belief that is statutory
interpretation permitting the return of a signed report to a m dical panel for
technical revision was correct.
26. La Jeunesse's purpose in permitting the return of the medical reports was to
correct errors of law or phrasing contained in the reports and to train the
physicians who had prepared them. He had no purpose to s stantively change
the medical opinion or the underlying result in any of the cas s.
27. Hann used this "discretion" in five cases between January an June of 2012.
28. La Jeunesse knew of three of these instances.
29. The commission determined, and the Court finds, that there as "no basis to
believe" that Hann or La Jeunesse had attempted "to influen e the panels'
opinions or change the substance of their reports." "Instead," the commission
concluded, they "were motivated by a desire to have the me ical panels clarify
their conclusions."
30. All of La Jeunesse's actions were taken as part of his duties a an ALJ and
Director of the Adjudication Division.
31. In at least two of these cases, Hann shredded the initial repor sent by the
medical panel.
5
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32. No evidence was offered that La Jeunesse knew of the shred ing until after the
practice of returning medical reports for changes was publicl known.
33. The database tracking the receipt of medical reports was alte ed to delete
reference to the report being delivered to the ALJ to show th t the report was
again with the medical panel. The system retained a notation of the original
delivery of the report and contained notes stating that the ori inal had been
shredded in at least two instances. However, no evidence wa offered suggesting
that La Jeunesse had anything to do, directly or indirectly, w' these database
entries.
34. In one of the three cases La Jeunesse knew about, Swenson v. Modern Display,
La Jeunesse was on the phone with the medical panel chair hen the changes
were discussed. The proposed report recommended a treatm nt protocol under
certain medical standards. These standards were not univers lly accepted in the
medical community and had not been adopted by the labor c mmission. La
Jeunesse explained to Dr. Holmes (the medical panel chair)
could not require specific standards without rulemaking. H
needed to clarify that the standards were not binding on trea
Holmes agreed to change the report, and offered to bring an

at the commission
told the doctor he
. g physicians. Dr.
mended report in

personally.
35. In another of the three cases La Jeunesse knew of, the Boyt c se, Dr. Rosen had
used language concerning causation indicating "possible but highly unlikely" for
a theory ascribed less than a 2% probability. At Hann's requ st, he changed his
opinion of causation to a simple "no" rather than using the q alified language.
Dr. Rosen did not feel the change altered the intent of his ori inal answers to the
questions posed to the panel.
36. In the Doherik case (the third case known to La Jeunesse), D . Rosen discussed
alternative factual versions of the fall at issue. The ALJ had lready made
findings regarding those facts, and Dr. Rosen deleted that di cussion. He
shortened other answers from more qualified answers to s' pIe "no" s in other
6
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answers. Rosen testified that, as in the Boyt case, he did not f el the requested
changes altered the panel's medical opinions.
37. No testimony was offered by any witness suggesting that th
three cases did not address legitimate concerns over the lega form of the reports.
No testimony was offered that any of the medical opinions'
substantively altered as a result of the contact from Hann or
case) La Jeunesse.
38. On June 5, 2012, Dori Petersen, a private practitioner at Black urn and Stoll,
el report. She was
called the commission to inquire about an overdue medical
told that Hann had received the report from Dr. Rosen and r jected it, sending it
back to the medical panel for correction. According to Peters n "If it were anyone
but Judge Hann, I probably wouldn't think much about this, ut it's Judge Hann.
The medical panel is enough of a wild card without Judge H nn instructing them
on how to prepare their report."
39. Petersen relayed these facts to other members of the bar prac icing at the
Workers' Compensation Fund ("WCF").
40. Petersen also called Alan Hennebold, a senior attorney at the Commission to ask
about the practice. He informed Petersen that the medical re ort had been
shredded.
41. Hennebold met with La Jeunesse on June 5, and directed him that parties should
be copied on any rejections or instructions to medical panel r ports. His opinion
at the time was that "while Judge Hann's actions may have b en entirely
appropriate, the lack of transparency is inappropriate."
42. Hennebold instructed La Jeunesse to inform all ALJs of this
43. Later, Sherri Hayashi, Labor Commissioner, instructed La Je esse to amend
existing policy to make clear that panel reports that were fla ed would be sent
to the parties.
7
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44. Hayashi requested an independent audit to determine the e tent of the practice.
45. The audit identified five cases in which medical reports wer sent pack to panels
without notice to the parties.
46. The original report was recovered in four of the five total cas s and in all three of
the cases known to La Jeunesse.

47. Hayashi placed La Jeunesse on administrative leave on June 3,2012, based on
the actions described above.
48. Hayashi terminated La Jeunesse from his position as Directo of the Adjudication
Division and ALJ on July 10, 2012. The termination was base on his "failure to
insist on open and transparent processes" involving the med cal panel reports.
49. Hayashi testified that the problem, in her view, was not the ecision to return the
reports for correction to the medical panels, but rather the fai ure to inform the
parties of that decision and the nature of the changes request d.
50. None of the three cases La Jeunesse knew about was appeale .
51. In at least two of the affected cases, new medical panels were convened. No
evidence was offered of any change in the result.
52. On August 14, 2012, WCF filed bar complaints against Hann

d La Jeunesse.

53. On August IS, WCF moved to recuse Hann from all of its cas s. The motion to
recuse attached a copy of the bar complaint. The motion was served on the new
Director of the Adjudication Division. It was not served on y of the parties to
the cases affected.

8
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54. The Motion to recuse was granted in two days, again no noti e was provided
prior to this decision to the other parties in the affected cases
55. No ALJ other than Hann engaged in the practice of rejecting
reports and requesting changes without notice to the parties

the affected case.

56. No written policy of the Labor Commission or Adjudication ivision expressly
forbade returning the medical panel report to the medical pa el. OPC attempted
to introduce an exhibit which, they proffered, established su a policy. OPC
acknowledged that this document was in its position prior to the date of initial
disclosures and did not demonstrate that it had been pro due d in initial
disclosures. OPC argued that, because it had received the do ment from La
Jeunesse's prior counsel, La Jeunesse suffered no harm from his failure to
disclose. La Jeunesse maintained that he did not know where the proffered
document had been obtained, knew nothing of its history, an had prepared
relying on OPC's initial disclosures omitting it. Based on thi , the Court
concluded the document had not been timely disclosed and t e failure to
disclose was not shown to be harmless, and therefore exclud d the document.
57. It appears that La Jeunesse drafted a policy, prior to the even s in question,
including the language "Once the ALJ receives the panel rep rt, it is mailed to
the petitioner and attorneys." It was not clear to what extent his earlier written
policy was distributed or effected within the Commission. L Jeunesse used the
earlier policy when asked to revise it in response to the event at issue, but it
does not appear to have been widely known - La Jeunesse fo d it because he
recalled working on it previously.
58. No evidence showed that La Jeunesse knew of the destructio of medical reports
after changes to them were requested until after the matter c me to light within
the commission. At best, La Jeunesse testified that this was surprising, given
the decision to request changes and the confidential nature 0 the medical
information discussed in the reports. After the fact, La Jeune se did not take
issue with this destruction for that reason.

9
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59. No evidence showed that La Jeunesse altered any database 0 instructed anyone
to do so. No evidence showed he agreed to any proposal to Iter any database or
authorized such action.
60. No person actually testified that he or she lost faith in the ad inistration of
justice as a result of these actions. Various witnesses speculat d as to other
parties' reactions to them.
61. The events drew unfavorable media attention.

Conclusions of Law
1. At the close of OPC's case, the Court granted a motion to dis iss in part. The
Court concluded that the evidence did not support a finding hat La Jeunesse
knew of or authorized either 1) the destruction of medical pa el reports when
first received; or 2) any alteration of the Commission's datab
2. The parties initially phrased their arguments in this case as
ether La Jeunesse
and other ALJs are obligated under the statute, upon receipt, 0 forward the
medical panel's report as received to the parties. La Jeunesse oints to subsection
2(b) of the statute providing that reports are to be made "in a form prescribed by
the Division" and also address" additional findings as the ad inistrative law
judge may require." OPC points to subsection 2(d), which pr vides that "an
administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copie of a report
submitted to the administrative law judge" to the parties.

3. Throughout the case, the parties presented competing views f the medical
panels. OPC and its witnesses (representatives of the defens bar and the
dependent"
Commissioner) attempted to portray the medical panels as
II'

arbiters. Testimony to the effect that medical panel opinions re generally
accepted by the ALJ and the Commission, and thus dispositi e, perhaps

10
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explained this perception. La Jeunesse emphasizes that med cal panels, though
impartial, only serve to advise the ALJ.
4. The Court concludes that the La Jeunesse's view is correct. e word
"independent" does not appear in §34A-2-601. Medical pane s make no
"findings" in the legal sense. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. . Bd. of Review of
Indus. Comm In of Utah, 839 P.2d 841, 847 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1 92). They are
"adjuncts" to the ALJ, and their purpose is to assist the ALJ' making his or her
findings. The ALJ, also an impartial neutral, is free to accept e panel's report or,
if there is substantial conflicting evidence, find to the contra
5. The structure of the statute is also informative. It expressly r quires that the
report is made by the panel to the ALJ, and the ALJ, after the report is submitted,
must promptly mail it to the parties. Neither "submitted" n "promptly" is
defined. This may seem like a close parse of the statute, but e Court presumes
there is some reason for requiring that the ALJ receive the p el report in
advance of the parties. The Court also notes that "promptly" oes not mean
"forthwith" or "immediately" and also presumes the Legisla re used this
milder, more flexible term advisedly. The Court does not beli ve that the
Legislature intended that, upon receipt of a flawed report, th ALJ has no option
but to mail it to the parties and await objections. A report ma fail to answer the
propounded questions. It may rely on facts contrary to the A 1's findings. It may
use language that, though medically appropriate, is legally wong. Under the
reading advanced by OPC, such flawed reports would neces 'tate a round of
objections, after which, according to the OPC, the ALJ could
clarification or amendment, or refer to another panel.

en request

6. OPC's reading of the statute, that clarification requests are pe mitted after an
original report is mailed to the parties, has no more support' the statutory
language than the reading advanced by La Jeunesse allowing a report to be
returned to the medical panel before distribution to the parti s. Once mailed to
the parties, an objection process starts. Absent objection, the port is admitted
into evidence. This would be true even if the ALJ, as the fact inder, determined
that the report failed to answer the proper questions using th correct
11
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assumptions. Even after objections, the statute is silent abou
further questions or correcting errors in the report. The statu
provision for correction beyond permitting the panel to mak
findings as the administrative law judge may require." Utah

propounding
e makes no
"additional
ode §34A-2-

601(2)(b). The statute does not specify at what point that mig
7. The Court's interpretation of the extent of the ALI's discretio is further
informed by Utah Code §34A-2-802(1), which provides:
The commission, the commissioner, an administrative la judge,
or the Appeals Board, is not bound by the usual commo law or
statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules or
procedure, other than as provided in this section or as ad pted by
the commission pursuant to this chapter and Chapter 3, tah
Occupational Disease Act. The commission may make its
investigation in such a manner as in its best judgment is
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the partie
carry out justly the spirit of the chapter.
8. The statute provides for review of the medical panel report b the ALJ prior to
mailing to the parties. Given the role of the medical panel as he ALI's assistant,
the statute implicitly permits the ALJ to seek further assistan e prior to deeming
the report as submitted and mailing it to the interested partie . La Jeunessse did
not prejudice the administration of justice by interpreting the statute to grant this
discretion to the ALJ.
9. Testimony of existing labor commission policies was unclear. As found above, it
appears that La Jeunesse drafted a policy, prior to the events question,
including the language "Once the ALJ receives the panel rep rt, it is mailed to
the petitioner and attorneys." It was not clear to what extent his written policy
was distributed or effected within the Commission. In any e ent, it reads too
much into this statement to imply a construction of the statut necessarily
requiring immediate delivery without review or comment b the ALJ.
10. A more difficult question arises whether or not the ALJ coul properly return the
report to the medical panel and request corrections without
Commissioner Hayashi viewed this (rather than a failure to·
12
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the report to the parties) as the problem and OPC also emph sized this point in
argument.

11. As an initial matter, the evidence is extremely thin as to this onduct as it relates
to La Jeunesse. As stated above, there is no evidence that La J unesse took any
action to conceal the return of the medical panel reports by d stroying them or
altering any electronic database reflecting their receipt. La Je nesse, in a
discussion with Hann, interpreted the statute to permit the r turn of the reports
to the panel. He also participated in a teleconference discuss' g changes with Dr.
Holmes. La Jeunesse was not assigned to any of the affected ases, and OPC
offered no testimony or evidence suggesting that this collater I participation in a
case would obligate an ALJ consulted by another ALJ to him elf provide notice
to the parties. The Court therefore considers whether the La eunesse's
participation with Hann in the contact with the medical pane was improper by
itself.
12. No testimony was offered that contact with medical panels
s prohibited. To
the contrary, the testimony was that medical panels were inv ted to contact the
assigned ALJ and discussed specific cases under review with ALJs, including at
their annual training sessions. Likewise, no testimony was 0 fered of an existing
policy (formal or informal) requiring these communications t be disclosed.
13. While ALJs are quasi-judicial, the Code of Judicial Conduct i instructive here.
Rule 2.9 of those Rules prohibits most ex parte communicatio s, outside of
certain defined parameters. One of those exceptions seem re vant here:
(A)(3) A judge may consult with court staff and court of . ials
whose functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the j dge's
adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges, provi ed the
judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual
information that is not part of the record and does not ab ogate
the responsibility to personally decide the matter.
14. The issue in this case is not whether better practice would be 0 inform parties
when a medical report is rejected by an ALJ, or other comm ication is made by
13
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the ALJ with a member of a medical panel. The issue is whe er an ALJ commits
an ethical or other violation when the ALJ fails to do so.
15. The medical panel is recruited, appointed and paid by the c mission to advise
the ALJ. As such, they are akin to a "court officials whose
ctions are to aid the
judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilitie "under Rule 2.9 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Moreover, the deliberately les formal nature of
the administrative process argues even more strongly that AI's can
appropriately have ex parte contact with persons specifically employed to
provide them expertise.
16. The nature of the contacts here illustrates the utility of recog izing this flexibility.
When a medical panel fails to follow binding interim finding and the ALJ
recognizes that fact in advance, it makes no sense to submit e flawed report to
the parties for objections, only to resubmit it to the panel the after. A report
based on factual assumptions inconsistent with the ALI's fin ings is not helpful,
and it is inefficient to require parties to make objections to it, r worse yet, to
admit it to evidence by default if no objections are made. Uk wise, if opinions
are hedged with percentages or remote qualifications, the re ort fails to clearly
communicate the actual opinion the panel intends the ALJ to se. If in the ALI's
view the opinion needs to be clarified, there is no purpose se ved by submitting
it to the parties for objections to the obvious.
17. Informing the parties of these corrections may seem laudable and even harmless
in theory. It is easy to argue that the more transparency, the etter. But that view
stems from an improper view of the medical panel as a separ te decision maker.
As discussed above, it is not. The medical panel functions as
adjunct to the
ALJ -analogous to an assistant or clerk. Rule 2.9 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
contemplates such communications between judges and emp oyed assistants. It
is the same rule that permits a judge to confer with a law cler or other judges.
In the informal atmosphere of administrative decision makin ,such
communications are even more appropriate. Requiring comp ete transparency
may inhibit free communication between the decision maker d his or her
assistants. It could also engender additional litigation over r port flaws and
14
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ALI's efforts to correct or clarify them. While the commissio is certainly free to
restrict its ALJs in such a manner if it chooses to, the statute oes not necessarily
require such a result.
18. The Court concludes that no existing statute or policy, forma or informal,
prohibited communications between a medical panel and A Js concerning a case
under review. No existing statute or policy required the par ·es to be informed
of such contacts.
19. Nevertheless, failure to disclose is potentially problematic. E parte
communications potentially inform the ALI's decision, and a sent disclosure the
parties are unable to address or respond to substantive com
the judge.
20. At least one court considering similar circumstances has con luded that such
contacts require reversal. Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Workers' C mpensation Appeals
Board, 153 Cal Ap. 3d 965 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1984). But the la is far from clear
as to the propriety of ex parte contacts with court-appointed experts or
consultants. See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting aubert's Invitation:
Defining A Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scienti c Validity, 43
Emory L.J. 995, 1029-33 (1994) (discussing apparently widesp ead contacts by
courts with court appointed experts) and John Shepard Wile, Jr., Taming Patent:
Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent Cases, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 14 3, 1459-60 (2003)
(analogizing technical advisors to law clerks, but acknowled ing a lack of
appellate authority). At least one California workers' compe sation decision
refers to a policy that would arguably permit the communica ions at issue here.
Blackledge v. Bank of America, 2010 Westlaw 2204836 (Cal W.e. .B.) (citing
WCAB/DWC policy prohibiting ex parte communications by ALJ with disability
raters "except to clarify or correct clerical or technical errors r omissions./I)
21. La Jeunesse's failure to disclose in these specific cases does n t rise to the level of
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. First, the was no testimony
that La Jeunesse authorized or instructed Hann not to disclos the
communications. La Jeunesse was not assigned to the cases a issue, so any duty
15
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to disclose would lie with Hann, and not La Jeunesse as ano
by her. Second, the specific changes in the cases known of b
not substantive and the parties were not deprived of a mean
to contest them-indeed, there was no evidence that any of t

er ALJ consulted
La Jeunesse were
gful opportunity
e requested

changes to the panel reports were inappropriate or altered t e panel's medical
conclusions. In each of the cases known to La Jeunesse the 0 .ginal report was
located and provided to the parties. Third, reasonable legal inds can differ as
to whether such communications involving technical correct ons to the medical
report are necessarily improper, or must be disclosed to the arties. Finally, the
preponderance of the evidence showed that the purpose of t e communications
was to conform the opinions to the appropriate legal framew rk, and thus avoid
non-substantive objections and the delay and expense associ ted with them.
22. Finally, OPC maintains that a violation of statute or policy is ot required to find
a violation of Rule 8.4(d). Instead, OPC argues all that is req 'red is 1) conduct
and 2) resulting prejudice t~ the administration of justice.
23. OPC argues that La Jeunesse's authorization and participatio in the return of
medical reports to medical panels without notice to the parti s constituted
conduct, and that it resulted in delay and increased costs. Th t, OPC argues, is
enough-the question of severity is reserved for the Court w en it determines
sanctions.
24. The Court rejects this reading of Rule 8.4. Attorneys and jud s interpret laws all
the time. On any given day, the Court is confronted by multi Ie cases involving
competing interpretations of law- at least one side is generall wrong. Attorneys
and judges take actions or ad vise others to take actions based on those
interpretations. Often, such an interpretation (it matters not hether it is right or
wrong, under the OPC's argument here requiring only cond ct) causes delay or
increased expense.

25. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 868-69 (Utah 1996) is a case in wh ch the Utah
Supreme Court interpreted similar language in the Utah Con titution concerning
judicial discipline. While the comparison is not entirely apt t this interpretation
16
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of the Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to attorneys, he concerns
expressed in that opinion are instructive:
The offenses that subject a judge to discipline should e
defined in such a way as to minimize the potential for
overlap between the judicial conduct machinery and
appeal process. For it is worth emphasis that a judge
behaved improperly simply because he has committe an
error. As we noted earlier, the entire appellate process is in
place because it is expected that judges will err occasi ally,
at least in the eyes of the appellate courts. This does n t
mean that they are not functioning properly as judges, only
that they are human beings functioning within a hum
institution where different people can see things differ ntly.
The [disciplinary] process cannot legitimately have as
purpose the punishment of those who commit legal er or;
rather, it must concern itself only with those who beh e
outside the ethical norms set for judges, and the consti tion
and implementing statutes and rules must be so const ued.
In re Worthen, at, 868-69.
26. OPC's proposed reading of 8.4 goes too far. By simply exam'
its asserted effect on the administration of justice, OPC fails t
error, which itself is part of the administration of justice. Ord
differences of opinion are not prejudicial to justice; they are s

ing "conduct" and
account for legal
ary error or
mething we expect

on the way to truth.
27. In addition, the Court cannot conclude that the actions here ecessarily resulted
in delay. To answer that question, the Court would have to h ve evidence
sufficient to conclude what delay might have been caused by the reports being
submitted without the requested corrections. No testimony r evidence as to
that scenario was offered.
28. The Comments to Rule 8.4 also provide guidance as to its pr
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitnes
practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the of
willful failure to file an income tax return. However, so
of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the
17
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was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitu e." That
concept can be construed to include offenses concerning orne
matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comp rable
offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for th practice
of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to th entire
criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answera Ie only
for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics rele ant to
law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, br ach of
trust or serious interference with the administration of ju tice are
in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even one of
minor significance when considered separately, can indi ate
indifference to legal obligation.
Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, Rule 8.4 (com ent 2), (quoted in
Utah State Bar v. Jardine, 2012 UT 67,176,289 P.3d 516, 533)

29. In re Worthen is again helpful. In explaining the terms "cond ct prejudicial to the
administration of justice" in the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, 13, the Supreme
Court concluded that language also implied some breach of thical canons:
Finally, the first clause employs the term "conduct
rather than the term "misconduct" as used in the fi st
ground for judicial discipline, which could, on its f ce,
suggest that the act or acts covered by this ground ould
be other than a breach of the ethical norms gover . g
judges. However, concerns about limiting the Commi sian's
jurisdiction to matters of misconduct, not legal error, as well as
concerns about vagueness and adequate notice, lead us 0
conclude that the term should carry the same de' ition
we gave to "misconduct," i.e., both grounds requir
"unjudicial conduct," which we defined as a brea of
the ethical canons contained in the Code of Judicia
Conduct.
In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853,870 (Utah 1996)(emphasis adde ).
30. Similarly, though Rule 8.4 is entitled "Misconduct" and uses that term in other
parts of the Rule, Section 8.4 (d) refers to just "conduct." As' Worthen, this on its
face supports OPC IS argument here. But for the same reaso s as articulated in
Worthen, the Court concludes that Rule 8.4(d) cannot be read to put stricter limits
on advocacy than those imposed by existing norms. Certa' y, an objectively
18
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reasonable position taken in good faith by an ALJ in fulfillm
duties cannot support a claim that the conduct taken as a res
Rule 8.4(d). The line to be drawn here needs to permit and e
acceptable legal advocacy including, in this case, administra
quasi-judicial process. For that reason, the line to be drawn

nt of his or her
It is a violation of
en encourage
on of an agency's
efining where a

Rule 8.4(d) begins should provide some daylight between re sonable
interpretations of law on the one hand and ethical violations n the other.
31. As found above, none of La Jeunesse's actions involved any orally questionable
motive. This is not a repeated pattern of independent violati ns but a single
change in interpretation affecting five cases. The Court has c ncluded that the
actions were either legally permitted or at least did not viola e express statute or
policy. More importantly, whether or not the actions were Ie ally correct or even
advisable, they were taken pursuant to objectively reasonabl legal
interpretations. No violation of Rule 8.4(d) has been shown.

32. The petition should be dismissed with prejudice. Counsel fo La Jeunesse is
directed to prepare an order of dismissal.

, / -fl-

OATED this ~ day of March, 2016.

Third District Court J
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Rule 8.4. Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to
achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable
rules of judicial conduct or other law.
(Emphasis added).
Comment
[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct or knowingly assist or induce another to do so through the acts of
another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer’s behalf.
Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning
action the client is legally entitled to take.
[1a] A violation of paragraph (a) based solely on the lawyer’s violation of another Rule of
Professional Conduct shall not be charged as a separate violation. However, this rule
defines professional misconduct as a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as the
term professional misconduct is used in the Supreme Court Rules of Professional
Practice, including the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. In this respect, if a
lawyer violates any of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the appropriate discipline may
be imposed pursuant to Rule 14-605.
[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as
offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return.
However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction
was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be
construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as
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adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the
practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a
lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those
characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach
of trust or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A
pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately,
can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or
conduct bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing
factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge’s finding that peremptory challenges
were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule.
[3a] The Standards of Professionalism and Civility approved by the Utah Supreme Court
are intended to improve the administration of justice. An egregious violation or a pattern
of repeated violations of the Standards of Professionalism and Civility may support a
finding that the lawyer has violated paragraph (d).
[4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith
belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good
faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to
challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.
[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of
other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the
professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as
trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a
corporation or other organization.
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Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601
(LexisNexis 2011)
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Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601 (Supp. 2010) (effective in 2012), in entirety:
(1)

(a) The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical aspects of a case described in this
Subsection (1)(a) to a medical panel appointed by an administrative law judge:
(i) upon the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of and in the course of
employment for:
(A) disability by accident; or
(B) death by accident; and
(ii) if the employer or the employer’s insurance carrier denies liability.
(b) An administrative law judge may appoint a medical panel upon
the filing of a claim for compensation based upon disability or
death due to an occupational disease.
(c) A medical panel appointed under this section shall consist of one or more
physicians specializing in the treatment of the disease or condition
involved in the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the
medical aspects of a controverted case, the division may employ a medical
director or one or more medical consultants:
(i) on a full-time or part-time basis; and
(ii) for the purpose of:
(A) evaluating medical evidence; and
(B) advising an administrative law judge with respect to the administrative
law judge’s ultimate fact-finding responsibility.
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or one or more medical consultants,
the medical director or one or more medical consultants is allowed to function in the
same manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel.

(2)

(a) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant may do the following to the
extent the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant determines that it is
necessary or desirable:
(i) conduct a study;
(ii) take an x-ray;
(iii) perform a test; or
(iv) if authorized by an administrative law judge, conduct a post-mortem
1
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examination.
(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall make:
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed by the
Division of Adjudication; and
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require.
(c) In an occupational disease case, in addition to the requirements of Subsection (2)(b), a
medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall certify to the administrative
law judge:
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work for
remuneration or profit;
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the medical
panel, medical director, or medical consultant results from the occupational
disease; and
(iii)
(A) whether any other cause aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any
way contributed to the disability or death; and
(B) if another cause contributed to the disability or death, the extent in
percentage to which the other cause contributed to the disability or death.
(d) (i) An administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a report
submitted to the administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by mail to:
(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer;
(C) the employer’s insurance carrier; and
(D) an attorney employed by a person listed in Subsections (2)(d)(i)(A)
through (C).
(ii) Within 20 days after the report described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is deposited
in the United States post office, the following may file with the administrative law
judge a written objection to the report:
(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer; or
(C) the employer’s insurance carrier.
(iii) If no written objection is filed within the period described in Subsection
(2)(d)(ii), the report is considered admitted in evidence.
(e) (i) An administrative law judge may base the administrative law judge’s finding and
decision on the report of:
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(A) a medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) one or more medical consultants.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e)(i), an administrative law judge
is not bound by a report described in Subsection (2)(e)(i) if other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding.
(f) (i) If a written objection to a report is filed under Subsection (2)(d), the administrative
law judge may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved.
(ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection (2)(f), any party may
request the administrative law judge to have any of the following present at the
hearing for examination and cross-examination:
(A) the chair of the medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) the one or more medical consultants.
(iii) For good cause shown, an administrative law judge may order the following
to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination:
(A) a member of a medical panel, with or without the chair of the medical
panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) a medical consultant.
(g) (i) A written report of a medical panel, medical director, or
one or more medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at a hearing described in
Subsection (2)(f).
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(g)(i), a report received as an exhibit under Subsection
(2)(g)(i) may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as the report is
sustained by the testimony admitted.
(h) For a claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultant before July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out of the Employers’
Reinsurance Fund established in Section 34A-2-702:
(i) expenses of a study or report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical
consultant; and
(ii) the expenses of the medical panel’s, medical director’s, or medical consultant's
appearance before an administrative law judge.
3
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(i)

(i) For a claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultant on or after July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out of the
Uninsured Employers’ Fund established in Section 34A-2-704 the expenses of:
(A) a study or report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant;
and
(B) the medical panel’s, medical director’s, or medical consultant’s appearance
before an administrative law judge.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the expenses described in Subsection (2)(i)(i)
shall be paid from the Uninsured Employers’ Fund whether or not the employment
relationship during which the industrial accident or occupational disease occurred is
localized in Utah as described in Subsection 34A-2-704(20).

Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-601 (2011) (emphasis added).
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